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The Coase Theorem is a simple proposition-in the absence of transac-
tion costs, a Pareto optimal' result will occur regardless of the initial
placement of legal liability.2 Despite this apparent simplicity, however,
Coase's economic parable has provoked intense debate in the legal
community. Why does the theorem grate on the hardened intuitions of
so many lawyers? The thesis of this Article is that a connection exists
between the adoption or rejection of a given school of legal thought
and the use of certain psychological constructs. Specifically, this Arti-
cle argues that the constructs underlying the Coase Theorem are in-
compatible with those underlying common-law thought,' and that the
uneasiness that lawyers have about the Coase Theorem reflects this
incompatibility.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. I am indebted to Bruce
Ackerman, David S. Clark, Susan McCready Edwards, and Kendra Gowdy Gjerdingen for
healthy criticism of an earlier version of this Article.
1. Pareto optimality is attained when the quantum of goods existing in society is allocated
so that "no reallocation can yield improvement for some without injuring others." D. ORR, PROP-
ERTY, MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 100 (1976). For a general discussion of
Pareto optimality, see J. HADAR, ELEMENTARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 278-302 (1967).
2. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
3. One of the premises of this Article is that "commonsense" or intuitionistic thought has
predictable and coherent structures. See infra note 90. A second premise is that traditional legal
analysis is a sophisticated form of intuitionistic thought, which, although ultimately grounded in
the intuitionistic thought of laypersons, takes on certain refinements because of particular political
or cultural influences. See infra notes 91, 186. See also infra text accompanying notes 212-17.
Thus, the term "common-law thought" is used in this Article in two different senses. The first and
broadest sense is simply to denote the general intuitions of the majority of society-the general
intuitionistic thought of laypersons. See infra notes 187-211 and accompanying text. The second
and more specific sense is to denote conventional legal analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 19-85, 138-86. See also infra note 186.
4. Generally, the Coase Theorem is seen as the foundation of the method of analysis
known as economic analysis of the law. It is true that Coase's article has been extensively relied
upon by the leading exponents of this approach, such as Posner and Calabresi. However, it is not
clear that the theorem's significance should be limited to this mode of legal analysis. See infra
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Coase used a rather simple fact situation to illustrate his now clas-
sic theorem. A rancher who raises cows and a farmer who raises corn
own adjoining land. The cows wander onto the farmer's land and de-
stroy some of the corn. Who should bear the loss, the rancher or the
farmer? For Coase, the starting point of the analysis is that both activi-
ties are "reciprocal."5 The presence of both ranching and farming is a
prerequisite to any damage to either, so that avoiding harm to one
party necessarily harms the other. Once this point is accepted, the re-
maining analysis is straightforward. Coase shows that in the absence of
transaction costs, an economically efficient allocation of resources will
result whether the initial legal liability is placed on the farmer or on the
rancher. If the liability is placed on the rancher, the damage done by
his cows to the farmer's corn (or a bribe to the farmer to decrease pro-
duction) becomes a cost added to the other costs of the production of
meat.6  The rancher will seek to produce up to the point where his
marginal costs equal his marginal benefits.' On the other hand, if the
liability is placed on the farmer, he also will produce up to the point
where his marginal costs equal his marginal benefits. In this case, the
damage to the corn (or a bribe to the rancher to reduce the number of
cows) will be a cost to the farmer.8 In either case, a Pareto optimal
result occurs through bargaining.9 The initial placement of legal liabil-
ity will affect the distribution of wealth,' 0 but not the attainment of an
note 205. Thus, while the conclusions reached in this Article can be applied to the relationship of
economic analysis and the common law, they do not necessarily have to be so limited.
5. Coase, supra note 2, at 2. Coase defined reciprocity in the following manner:
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has
to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a
problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The
real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be
allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.... [An] example
is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land.
If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, an increase in the supply of meat can only be
obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is
clearn meat or crops.
Id
6. Id at 2-6.
7. Id
8. Id at 6-8.
9. Id at 8.
10. Although this point was merely implicit in Coase's original article, it has been developed
in subsequent commentary on the Coase Theorem. As one commentator has phrased it:
The traditional understanding of Coase's theorem might be summarized as follows:
allocative efficiency, or the maximum productive use of resources, does not depend on
the initial assignment of entitlements. The initial assignment is only the starting point
from which negotiations begin. The point at which negotiations cease represents the
efficient allocation of resources. The initial assignment of entitlements, however, does
affect the relative wealth of the competing parties simply because the assignment deter-
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efficient allocation of resources.'1
As noted above, the critical step in Coase's argument is the as-
sumption of reciprocity; once reciprocity is accepted, the economic con-
clusions logically follow. 2 Only in recent years have the implications
of the reciprocity argument begun to be developed. To date, the criti-
ques of the Coase Theorem have focused on the economic 3 or polit-
mines which party has to do the purchasing (or what economists misleadingly call
"bribing").
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction" Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221,225 (1980). See also Baker, The Ideology of/the Economic Analysis of
Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 7-27 (1975) (criticizing economic analysis for its bias toward the
wealthy in resource allocation); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, andInalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095-96, 1098-99 (1972) (advocating
conferring legal entitlements on the basis of their wealth distribution effects) [hereinafter cited as
Property Rules]; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 422-44 (1981) (the wealth effects of entitlement placement may often determine the
outcome of a case).
11. Coase, supra note 2, at 8.
12. The main contribution of Coase's analysis was, first, the reciprocity assumption, and,
second, its application to legal thought. The particular economic principles he used, on their own,
were not that significant, for once the reciprocity assumption is made, the economic principles
applied are commonly accepted as standard fare. As expressed in one of the first important treat-
ments of the Coase Theorem and its relation to legal theory:
[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargain-
ing, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains. Far
from being surprising, this statement is tautological, at least if one accepts any of the
various classic definitions of misallocation. These ultimately come down to a statement
akin to the following: A misallocation exists when there is available a possible realloca-
tion in which all those who would lose from the reallocation could be fully compensated
by those who would gain, and, at the end of this compensation process, there would still
be some who would be better off than before.
This and other similar definitions of resource misallocation merely mean that there
is a misallocation when a situation can be improved by bargains. If people are rational,
bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments to bargains, transactions will ex
hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation; to the
point, in short, of optimal resource allocation. We can, therefore, state as an axiom the
proposition that all externalities can be internalized and all misallocations, even those
created by legal structures, can be remedied by the market, except to the extent that
transactions cost money or the structure itself creates some impediments to bargaining.
It may be that this welfare economics analogue to Say's law has always been quite
obvious to economists, although if it has its relevance has too frequently been ignored.
In any event, lawyers who use economics have in virtually every case been hopelessly
confused on the subject.
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. L. &
EcoN. 67, 68-69 (1968) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Transaction
Costs].
13. See, eg., Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (1982) (the final obstacle to
efficient outcomes is not transaction costs, but noncooperative bargaining); Nutter, The Coase The-
orem on Social Cost: A Footnote, I1 J. L. & EcoN. 503, 504 (1968) (Coase Theorem applies to
long-run allocations of resources as well as short-run allocations); Regan, The Problem of Social
Cost Revisited, 15 J. L. & EcoN. 427, 427 (1972) (Coase Theorem cannot be deduced from the
traditional assumptions about individual economic behavior). For an excellent summary of the
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ical14 implications of the theorem. Rarely, however, have critiques
centered on the psychological foundations of the theorem.' 5  These
foundations, however, merit attention, for they hold the promise of ex-
plaining the reluctance of such a large percentage of the legal commu-
nity to accept the rationale behind the theorem.
As a first step in the analysis, section I of this Article compares the
two different psychological perspectives on the Coase Theorem found
in the current debate between the moralist and economic analysis
schools of tort theory. A comparison of the moralist theory as ex-
pressed by Richard Epstein and the economic analysis theory as ex-
pressed by Guido Calabresi aptly demonstrates the dichotomy between
the two different psychological perspectives.' 6 Epstein builds his the-
ory of strict liability on the rejection of the Coase Theorem as a norma-
tive legal concept. 7 In contrast, Calabresi develops an extensive
economic theory of torts based on the Coase Theorem. 8 More impor-
tantly, however, their respective rejection and acceptance of the theo-
rem correlate with the implicit use of contrasting sets of psychological
constructs. The different psychological structures inherent in the per-
ception each has of the Coase Theorem are coherent and structured, yet
ultimately incompatible.
Section II explores the underlying bases for these psychological
constructs, using some of the work of Jean Piaget in developmental
current economic literature on the Coase Theorem, see Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem:
Some Experimental Tests, 25 J. L. & ECON. 73, 73-77 & n.3 (1982).
14. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONrG 81-107 (1978) (describing economic analysis as
an instrumental view that diminishes the concept of person); Baker, supra note 10, at 12 (initial
assignment of rights has a wealth effect that alters resource allocation); Horwitz, Law andEconom-
ics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905, 911-12 (1980) (economic analysis has an inher-
ently conservative bias); Kennedy, supra note 10, at 388 (the use of efficiency as a criterion for
policy-making provides indeterminate solutions); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth
Discontinuity The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL L. REV. 617, 628-30 (1973)
(Coase overlooks the structural complexity implicit in the assignment of rights).
15. The psychological arguments discussed in this Article appear to animate the discussion
of the reciprocity assumption of the Coase Theorem in Coleman, supra note 10, at 235-36. For
another treatment of the psychological structure of legal thought that draws conclusions different
from those developed in this Article, see Hermann, A Structuralist Approach to Legal Reasoning,
48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131, 1159 (1975) (developing a structuralist theory to explain legal reasoning
that assigns equal weight to all cultural and psychological constructs, whereas this Article focuses
on reification, causation, and moral responsibility to explain the psychological structures of com-
mon-law thought).
16. This dichotomy was first suggested in the work of Harper and James. In their torts
casebook, they argued that rules in certain areas of tort law may be explained in economic rather
than moral terms. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 759-84 (1956) (loss distribution
and insurance are goals of accident law). For further discussion of Harper & James' treatment of
accident law, see Heuston, Book Review, 9 STAN. L. REV. 840, 841 (1957); Keeton, Book Review,
45 CALIF. L. REv. 230, 232 (1957).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 19-33.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 54-65.
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psychology. Piaget's description of the development of human thought
suggests that the psychological constructs used by Epstein and Cala-
bresi correlate with a larger set of contrasting psychological constructs
that both perform an important role in the development of thought in
children and remain influential in the thinking of adults.
Section III expands the analysis beyond the Epstein/Calabresi dis-
pute to two other developments in legal theory. The first is the delinea-
tion by Bruce Ackerman of ordinary observing and scientific
policymaking as distinct modes of thought in the present legal culture.
The second is the debate between Mark Kelman and Matthew
Spitzer/Elizabeth Hoffman over the existence of empirical proof of the
Coase Theorem. The analysis of these two areas confirms the impor-
tance of the present psychological dichotomy regarding the Coase The-
orem, and also suggests that this dichotomy is mirrored in larger
developments in legal thought such as the psychology of common-law
thought and the construction of reality by lawyers. This leads to the
conclusion of the Article that the Coase Theorem is controversial in
part because its psychological assumptions are incompatible with those
of traditional legal training.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
COASE THEOREM-THE EPSTEIN/CALABRESI
DEBATE
The disagreement between Richard Epstein and Guido Calabresi over
the role of torts in society is ultimately a disagreement over the Coase
Theorem's reciprocity assumption. Their acceptance or rejection of the
reciprocity assumption, however, is grounded in their implicit adher-
ences to different psychological constructs. This section considers how
the psychological constructs used by Epstein to support his theory lead
to the rejection of the reciprocity argument, and how, on the other
hand, the different constructs used by Calabresi lead to the adoption of
reciprocity.
A. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EPSTEIN'S STRICT LIABILITY
1. Epstein's Theory of Strict Liability
Epstein's tort theory 9 is dominated by two characteristics. The first is
19. This analysis of Epstein's work is based primarily on his theory of strict liability as devel-
oped in a series of four articles: Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Strict Liability]; Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict
Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Defenses and Subsequent Pleas]; Ep-
stein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Intentional Harms];
Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: .4 Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979)
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his characterization of "tort law as a system not of resource allocation
but of corrective justice."20  Correspondingly, he adopts a historical
rather than end-state theory of justice.21 For Epstein, tort law as a sub-
stantive matter "looks to the conduct, broadly defined, of the parties to
the case with a view toward the protection of individual liberty and
private property."' The first step in the development of his historical
theory is to identify the rights that should be protected. 3 The second
step is "to give an account of the permissible 'moves' that allow private
parties to switch from one set of entitlements to another."'24
The second characteristic of Epstein's theory is that the source of
corrective justice standards is the common sense or everyday notions of
ordinary people.25 In one of his first articles, he noted that "[t]here is a
need for a systematic inquiry which refines, but which does not aban-
don, the shared impressions of everyday life."26 He maintains that the
"task [of torts] is to develop a normative theory of torts that takes into
account common sense notions of individual responsibility."2 7 Based
on this analysis, Epstein argues that the concept of strict liability rather
than negligence "provides a suitable justification for the imposition of
liability in tort."28 A prima facie case "rests on causal notions alone,
[hereinafter cited as Causation and Corrective Justice]. Additional articles relevant to the present
analysis are Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 . LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980);
Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Posses-
sion]; Epstein, Nuisance Law Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
49 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Nuisance Law].
20. Defeses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 215.
21. IntentionalHarms, supra note 19, at 441-42. In a footnote, Epstein states that his theory
is consistent with that developed by Nozick. Id at 441 n.129. See general/y R. NozicK, ANAR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974) (advocating the historical, or process, theory ofjustice).
22. Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 441.
23. Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 50-53; Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 441.
24. Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 441.
25. Strict Liabiliy, supra note 19, at 151-52.
26. Id at 151.
27. Id
28. Id at 152. The political implications of reification are a perennial issue in property law.
An excellent recent treatment of the topic is Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982). Radin starts with the intuition prominent in "liberal property theory that focuses on
personal embodiment or sel-constitution in terms of 'things."' Id at 958. She then notes that
"[m]ost people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves." Id at 959; see Id
at 959-61. From this, she concludes that these intuitions are best treated by a political foundation
for claims to personal property grounded in the concept of "personhood." While developing this
concept of property and personhood, however, Radin also recognizes that other criteria for under-
standing the appeal of this intuitive concept "might be sought [as well] by appeal to extrinsic
moral reality [or] to scientific truths of psychology." Id at 962. The theories developed in this
Article can be viewed in part as an attempt to treat from a psychological perspective many of the
same intuitive tensions in the nature of property that Radin treats from a political perspective.
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subject to a series of defenses, replies, and the like, which are designed
to reduce the gap between notions of causation and those of
responsibility."2 9
Epstein's assessment of liability on the facts of the Coase Theorem
is straightforward.30 In the normal conversation of ordinary persons,
the happenings would be described in the simple declarative sentence,
"The cows ate the corn," an obvious case of prima facie liability and a
special case of the general declaration, 'W/ caused harm to B.''31 Ep-
stein strongly and unequivocably rejects the Coase Theorem by taking
issue with the Coasean reciprocity assumption. Epstein agrees with
Coase's economic analysis.32  However, using the proposition '
caused harm to B," Epstein argues that when the party harmed (B)
seeks redress in court, reciprocity no longer exists. Since, has harmed
or threatened to harm B, B is now justified in invoking judicial author-
ity to protect his interests, although in so doing Coase would argue that
B has harmed A. This harm is justified by the prior and unjustified
harm imposed upon B by 4. Whereas Coase's reciprocity assumption
is premised upon simultaneous harms, Epstein argues that the harms
are distinct, and that the second harm is warranted by the first. Thus,
to Epstein the Coasean reciprocity assumption is flawed, because "[t]he
proposition that WA hit B' cannot be treated as synonymous with the
proposition that 'B hit A.' ,33 Thus, Epstein does not quarrel with
Coase's assertion that, assuming reciprocity, a Pareto optimal result
will occur regardless of the initial placement of legal liability. Instead,
Epstein argues that the theorem is incorrect as a normative basis for
29. Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 213.
30. See Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 164-69.
3 I. ld at 165-68. Epstein posits four paradigmatic cases which best capture the ordinary use
of the causal language 'W caused B harm"-force, fright, compulsion, and dangerous condition.
Id at 166-89. As Epstein explains:
The first of these rests on the simple notion of the use of force and is captured in the
proposition, A hit B, with its simple transitive structure. The second paradigm, A fright-
ened B, has much the same grammatical structure as the first, but requires us to take into
account B's response to A's actions in order to complete the causal chain. The third
paradigm, A made B hit C, states a connection between A and C only through the acts of
B which A conipelled, and thus requires us to take into account the behavior of a third
party. The last of these paradigms, A created a dangerous condition that resulted in B's
harm, demands a detailed analysis of, first, the kinds of conditions that should be re-
garded as dangerous, and, second, the impact of the actions or events that intervened
between A's conduct and B's harm. For all of their internal differences, each of these
paradigms reveals a domination of A, the author of the action, over B, its object that
prima facie calls for redress by the law of torts.
Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 168. Epstein posits that the "simplest instance of
causation [is] the application of force to a person or thing." Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 166.
32. Strict Liabiity, supra note 19, at 164 n.40.
33. Id at 167.
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tort theory because of his objection to the reciprocity assumption.
Based on this rejection of the Coase Theorem as the foundation of a
normative theory of tort law, Epstein develops his moral theory that
society should prevent A from unjustifiably harming B.
2. The Psychology of Strict Liability
Epstein's rejection of the Coase Theorem reflects the use of at least
three basic psychological constructs: reification, causation, and moral
responsibility. Each is discussed in turn.
a. Refcation: Epstein's rejection of the reciprocity assumption is
compelled, at least in part, by his use of reification. His theory of strict
liability is premised on a desire to protect private property and individ-
ual rights. What is property or what is a right, however, is in turn de-
fined by reification.34 When reification is used, rights are treated as if
they exist in things.35 In particular, two concepts are used together.
The first is that a real or imagined thing must be damaged before a tort
can occur. If a tangible thing such as an object or one's own body is
involved, no particular problem exists. If, however, a tangible thing
does not exist to define the property, one will be imagined to exist; it
will be reified. For example, while real property is defined in part by a
tangible thing (the land itself), the total property rights protected are
defined in part by reification of abstract rights. Additional spacio-
temporal dimensions are presumed to exist. Thus, in Epstein's theory,
real property "boundary lines have the same hard-edged quality as foul
lines in baseball, while the ad coelum rule36 defines (within limits) the
interest in the subsoil below and the airspace above. Within these
boundaries the owner has exclusive possession and control. 37
The second concept, used in conjunction with the first, is that these
34. The general discussion in this and the next paragraph deals with implicit assumptions in
Epstein's work as a whole. Particularly strong evidence of such views, however, may be found in
Possession, supra note 19, at 1238-43; Nuisance Law, iupra note 19, at 50-73; Causation and Cor-
rective Justice, supra note 19, at 499-502; Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 423-41.
35. A general definition of reification is the transformation of an abstract concept into some-
thing concrete. Bruce Ackerman has used the term to mean "misplaced concreteness." B. ACKER-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1977). See also Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934) (legal realists argue against undue reliance in indeter-
minate rules that classical thinkers reify into concrete facts); Leff, ContractAs Thing, 19 AM. U. L.
REv. 131, 147 (1970) (a contract should not be treated as a negotiation process, but as a reifled
"thing" that is part of the bundle of things that is purchased).
36. The ad coelum rule grants the owner of land ownership rights "up to the heavens and
down to the depths." Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 53 n.12.
37. Id at 53 (footnote omitted).
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things must be owned by a person. For Epstein, "[pirivate property is
an external manifestation of the principle of personal autonomy."38
The ownership is one of absolute dominion. The right of property
gives to its owners the exclusive possession or use of the subject matter
in question.39 For property rights, people have rights in things; for per-
sonal rights, people have rights in their own bodies. In each case, a
corresponding relationship exists between the object and the person-
rights exist in things that in turn are owned by people. The distinction
Epstein draws between personal and property rights is that with per-
sonal rights the thing and the person are united, while with property
rights they are separated.
b. Causation: A second psychological construct that Epstein re-
lies on is cause.' Reification defines what is protected by transforming
an abstract right into a concrete object. An act without harm to these
rights, however, is not actionable; for Epstein, neither is harm without
an act.4 1 The concept of cause links together an act and a harm. For
Epstein, cause defines, prima facie, acts that invade the rights of an-
other.42 Commonsense notions of cause are stressed.43 For Epstein,
"[cause] is dominant in the law because it is dominant in the language
that people, including lawyers, use to describe conduct and to deter-
mine responsibility."'  Invasions of the rights of another describe "a
natural state of affairs which in itself serves as a justification for impos-
ing legal responsibility." 45 Within this framework of corrective justice,
particular importance is placed on force, movement, and irreversibility
38. Id at 63.
39. Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 19, at 500-01; Nuisance Law, supra note 19,
at 53. Consistent with this idea of absolute dominion, trespass by the plaintiff is made a defense to
a prima facie tort case. Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 201-13.
40. This general description is drawn from Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 19, at
477-99; Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 53-65; Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 428-33; De-
fenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 167-85; Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 160-89.
41. See infra note 52.
42. Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 168-69. See generally id at 168-213 (applying potential
defenses to the prima facie case in which plaintiff has harmed defendant).
43. Epstein repeatedly makes references to such sources as "[t]he ordinary man," Causation
and Corrective Justice, supra note 19, at 484, "common sense," Strict Liability, supra note 19, at
151, and "our intuitions," Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 19, at 479. See also Ep-
stein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarshi? (Book Review), 30 STAN. L. REv. 635, 649-56
(1978) (reviewing B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTITUTION (1977)) (respond-
ing to Ackerman's attack on Epstein's "ordinary man" analysis); supra text accompanying notes
26-27 (tort theory should reflect commonsense notions of individual responsibility).
44. Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 164.
45. Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
19831
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L4W REVIEW [Vol. 56:711
of action.' For example, Epstein posits that the "simplest instance of
causation [is] the application of force to a person or thing."4 7 More-
over, the consequences of acts rather than the intent of the action are
dominant.48
c. Moral responsibility: The third and final psychological con-
struct implicit in Epstein's theory is a link between cause and moral
responsibility for the act.49 Moral responsibility posits that social or
moral standards of behavior exist in the world, so that individual re-
sponsibility for a wrongful act always exists.50 By combining reifica-
tion, which determines what is protected, and causation, which
determines which acts violate those rights, with the construct of moral
responsibility, a clear determination of who is liable for the invasions of
those rights can be found. As Epstein explains:
The choice is plaintiff or defendant, and the analysis of causation is
the tool which, prima fade, fastens responsibility upon the defend-
ant. Indeed for most persons, the difficult question is often not
whether these causal assertions create the presumption, but whether
there are in fact any means to distinguish between causation and re-
sponsibility, so close is the connection between what man does and
what he is answerable for.51
Thus, for Epstein, the norm is individual responsibility, discoverable by
combining reification and causation.52
3. Epstein's Tort Theory and the Coordinated Use of Re'fication,
Causation, and Moral Responsibility
Epstein's objection to the Coase Theorem is that its reciprocity assump-
tion fails to satisfy at least one of his three psychological constructs.
46. See Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 174-80; Strict Liability, supra note
19, at 165-84.
47. Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 166.
48. See Intentional Harms, supra note 19, at 391.408; Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra
note 19, at 169-85; Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 165-84, 195-97.
49. See Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 53-54; Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 168-69.
50. The term "moral responsibility" conforms with Piaget's concept of "moral realism." See
infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
51. Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 169. All persons are deemed equally responsible for
their acts. For example, no initial distinction is made between the adult and the child, the intelli-
gent and the insane, or the healthy and the infirm. See Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note
19, at 169-74.
52. Epstein also believes that this responsibility follows only from the act of a person, not
from omissions or natural conditions. Compare, ag., Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 166-67
(need for human act) with id, at 189-95 (omissions) and Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 54-55
(natural conditions of land).
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Although Epstein's response to the reciprocity argument is directed
only to the causation element, he implicitly requires that all three of his
constructs, not just causation, be used simultaneously. The reciprocity
assumption, for example, could be premised on an acceptance of causa-
tion and individual responsibility, but a rejection of a preexisting right
in the farmer to the exclusive dominion of his property. Alternatively,
it could be premised on a rejection of individual responsibility, even
assuming causation and reified property rights. Epstein's response to
the reciprocity assumption, however, is consistent with his combined
reliance on intuitive concepts of reification, causation, and responsibil-
ity. Having presupposed the validity of using such constructs in legal
argument, Epstein, when presented with the facts of the Coase Theo-
rem, can only conclude: first, that the farmer has complete dominion
over the space defined by the boundaries of his land; second, that the
actions of the rancher's cows caused damage to the farmer since they
invaded the boundaries which marked out the imagined extent of his
right to absolute dominion; and, third, that the rancher is personally
responsible for such actions.53 Epstein's rejection of the Coase Theo-
rem thus is deeper than a simple disagreement about causation. While
53. See Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 58-60 & n.31; Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra
note 19, at 197-201.
The linking of these three qualities was not immediately evident in Epstein's work simply
because he chose to focus initially on the cause aspect of the Coase Theorem. Strict Liability,
supra note 19, at 164-67. In his early articles on strict liability, Epstein made a few passing re-
marks about the need to identify the class of rights protected. E.g., Intentional Harms, supra note
19, at 441. He did not begin to define the types of rights protected, however, until Nuisance Law,
supra note 19. In that article he recognized that " [t]ort law. . . presupposes some prior, in-
dependent method for defining and recognizing property rights both in the person and in external
objects," id at 52, and that "It]he first step [in a corrective justice system of nuisance].. . is the
identification of the plaintiffs protected interest," id at 50. Only after such interest is identified is
it appropriate to turn to causal principles to specify the person whose act was responsible for the
damage. See id at 53-54. An article by Richard Posner attacked this aspect of Epstein's theory.
Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 465-71 (1979). In response,
Epstein made explicit his dual reliance on ownership and causation. Causation and Corrective
Justice, supra note 19, at 498-502. According to Epstein:
Ownership and tort flow from a single conception of autonomy and inviolability. The
only thing that separates them is that ownership rules concentrate upon the organization
of rights before any violation occurs or is threatened, while tort law concentrates upon
those same rights after one person separates himself from the mass by violating or threat-
ening to violate the rights of another.
Id at 501. Epstein's theory of property rights is further developed in Possession, supra note 19;
Privacy, Properly JNjghts, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REv. 455, 455-65 (1978).
For another article recognizing the inherent incompatibility of conventional legal reasoning
and economic analysis, and also the connection between notions of fault, causation, and responsi-
bility, see Fried, ThertfficialReason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REv. 35, 44-
49 (1981). As Fried notes, "concepts such as entitlement, fault, property, and responsibility make
legal concepts insoluble in the medium of economic discourse." Id at 46.
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the reciprocity assumption serves as a convenient focus for his attack,
Epstein's disagreement with the Coase Theorem is actually a disagree-
ment over: (1) Coase's failure to rely primarily upon the coordinated
use of reification, causation, and individual responsibility in the con-
struction of reality and (2) Coase's failure to use these concepts in legal
argument.
B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COASEAN TORT THEORY
1. Calabres's Theory of Torts
In contrast to Epstein, Guido Calabresi 4 accepts the Coase Theorem as
a normative basis for a theory of tort liability.55 Thus, Calabresi ac-
cepts the reciprocity assumption's application to tort cases, as well as
Coase's conclusion that in a world of perfect information and no trans-
action costs, the initial placement of legal liability does not affect the
ultimate attainment of an efficient allocation of resources.5 6 However,
Calabresi recognizes that these two conditions are rarely, if ever, met,
so that in the imperfect market that characterizes virtually all transac-
tions, the initial placement of liability is frequently the final placement
of liability. 7 Because of the presence of costs in determining which
party should bear legal liability, especially in the long run, Calabresi
develops a theory for the determination of legal entitlements and
obligations.
From these premises, Calabresi structures a theory of tort law in
which he "takes it as axiomatic that the principle function of accident
law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoid-
54. Much of Calabresi's theory of torts is contained in G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccI-
DENTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS]. For other general work by Calabresi
that evidences his approach to torts, see Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, in
AMERiCAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY 103 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976); Property Rules, supra note 10;
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 713 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The DecisionforAccdents]; Transaction Costs, supra note 12;
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 69 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Concerning Cause]; Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and.Accl-
dents, 84 YALE Li. 656 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Optimal Deterrence]; Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Towarda Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055 (1972); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution].
55. Calabresi initially had criticized the Coase Theorem as not holding true in the long run.
The Decision for Accidents, supra note 54, at 730 n.28, 731 n.30. However, he later withdrew his
criticism in Transaction Costs, supra note 12, at 67-68. This change is also evident in COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 138-39 & n.7; Optimal Deterrence, supra note 54, at 657 n.5.
56. Transaction Costs, supra note 12, at 67.
57. COSTS OF ACCIDENT, supra note 54, at 135-38; Optimal Deterrence, spra note 54, at 657
THE COASE THEOREM
ing accidents.""8 From the standpoint of economic efficiency this
means setting entitlements on the basis of the following principles:
(1) that economic efficiency standing alone would dictate that set of
entitlements which favors knowledgeable choices between social
benefits and the social costs of obtaining them, and between social
costs and the social costs of avoiding them; (2) that this implies, in
the absence of certainty as to whether a benefit is worth its costs to
society, that the cost should be put on the party or activity best lo-
cated to make such a cost-benefit analysis; (3) that in particular con-
texts like accidents or pollution this suggests putting costs on the
party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them; (4) that in the
absence of certainty as to who that party or activity is, the costs
should be put on the party or activity which can with the lowest
transaction costs act in the market to correct an error in entitlements
by inducing the party who can avoid social costs most cheaply to do
so; and (5) that since we are in an area where by hypothesis markets
do not work perfectly-there are transaction costs-a decision will
often have to be made on whether market transactions or collective
fiat is most likely to bring us closer to the Pareto optimal result the
"perfect" market would reach.59
Other end-state goals, such as distribution of wealth or other "justice"
concerns, are also considered in setting entitlements. 60
Since Calabresi's tort theory is in part based on the Coase Theo-
rem, it diverges from Epstein's theory in several significant respects. 6'
First, commonsense intuitions are no longer used as normative stan-
dards. Rather, the method of analysis shifts to an empirical study of
the availability of information and cost considerations.62 Calabresi's
analysis also looks to end-state considerations such as overt political
58. COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 26.
59. Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1096-97 (footnotes omitted).
60. See CosTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 24-26 (describing the concept of 'Justice");
Concerning Cause, supra note 54, at 73-91 (explaining compensation and deterrence goals); Prop-
erty Rules, supra note 10, at 1098-1105 (discussing distributional goals).
61. On several occasions Calabresi specifically contrasts the issues significant to a Coasean
analysis with those associated with conventional intuitionistic notions about torts. See CosTS OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, 17-23 (describing some common areas of confusion in traditional tort
analysis); id at 244-87 (comparing the fault system of conventional tort analysis with accident cost
reduction); Optimal Deterrence, supra note 54, at 657-60 (clarifying confusion in "the fault system"
and strict liability); Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 54, passim (criticizing the
ambiguity in the use of the term "risk distribution" in traditional tort analysis).
62. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54,passim (developing a theory of torts based on
empirical data); Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1115-24 (discussing the economic effect of using
different entitlement rules); Transaction Costs, supra note 12, at 69-70 (discussing the problems of
misallocation of resources).
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choices.63  Epstein's theory, on the other hand, focuses more on the
particular goal of reducing harms.64 Second, the substantive issues
change dramatically under a Coasean analysis, in that both property
rights and causation-the linchpins of Epstein's theory-take on radi-
cally different forms. 65 The underlying basis of these differences is that
the Coase Theorem, and thus work derived from it, such as Calabresi's
work in torts, takes a different position with respect to each of Epstein's
three principal psychological assumptions.
2. The Psychology of the Coase Theorem
a. Reffcation: Reification is not used in Calabresi's work to de-
fine what is protected by tort law. Instead of property rights and per-
sonal rights, Calabresi's theory protects "entitlements. ' '66 This analysis
implicitly rejects the notion that rights exist in people with respect to
things in several ways. First, the type of right protected is no longer
defined solely by reference to particular things; rather, the Coase Theo-
rem presupposes a psychological framework that allows rights to exist
between people with respect to things, not in things. The relevant focus
is on the rights of one person vis-&-vis another.67 The decision as to the
person to favor does not follow from any physical or spacio-temporal
conditions, but rather by reference to some larger normative or societal
structure.68 Rights are defined by reference to what their holders may
do as compared to other people, and entitlements designate what action
63. See, e.g., Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1122 n.62 (discussing the administration of
various rules through political institutions). See also infra note 79 (Calebresi's four goals for torts).
64. See supra text accompanying note 22.
65. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 174-97 (using specific deterrence to allocate
liability for accidents by collective decisions regarding end-state goals); Concerning Cause, supra
note 54,passim (analyzing causation in light of the goals of Coasean rather than common-law tort
theory); Property Rules, supra note 10,passim (formulating new conceptions of property rights to
conform to Coasean tort theory).
66. Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1090.
67. As Calabresi explains:
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of
"entitlement." Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor. Absent such
a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of "miht
makes right"-whoever is stronger or shrewder will win. Hence the fundamental thing
that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.
Id (footnote omitted).
68. See CosTS OF AccIDmNTs, supra note 54, at 24-33 (promoting justice and reducing acci-
dent costs are the goals of tort law); Concerning Cause, supra note 54, at 73-91 (discussing compen-
satory and distributional goals); Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1093-1105 (entitlements are
granted if they further economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and other justice
considerations).
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may be taken with respect to the claims of other people. For example,
a person may have an entitlement to clean air that a polluting factory
would be compelled to respect. The entitlement does not imply owner-
ship in the air itself or a particular space, but only that, should a con-
flict arise between the holder of the entitlement and another party, the
holder of the entitlement is preferred. As such, the concept of entitle-
ment deviates from Epstein's theory not only because it is concerned
with the rights between people with respect to things rather than rights
in things, but also because it includes claims about conduct as well as
claims about tangible things.
Moreover, the reciprocity assumption also reduces the need to rely
on reification. Once causation and the physical invasion it implies no
longer necessarily determine violations of rights, physical boundaries
are no longer as important. Similarly, once real or imagined physical
boundaries no longer are the determinants of "property," causation be-
comes difficult to apply as a primary means to designate violations of
property rights. Physical things and physical invasions thus are no
longer the touchstones of rights and violations. Entitlements may exist
without reference to things69 and mental or psychic harm may be con-
sidered even though no physical invasion has occurred. 0
Calabresi also implicitly rejects reification when he recognizes that
a right no longer implies absolute dominion. Entitlements are either
inalienable, or are protected by a property rule or a liability rule.7 An
entitlement protected by a property rule cannot be taken without the
consent of the entitlement holder.7 2  In contrast, an entitlement pro-
tected by a liability rule can be taken without the holder's consent upon
69. See, e.g., Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1102-05 (entitlement to silence).
70. See id at 1111-15 (certain fundamental moral entitlements, such as freedom, are deemed
inalienable even if the entitlement holder wants to sell them because of the psychic effects of such
a transaction on other members of society). See also G. CALBRESI & P. BOBBITr, TRAGIC
CHoicEs 32 (1978) (discussing the difficulty in pricing "moralisms"); Concerning Cause, supra note
54, at 78 n.12 (injury or harm not limited to physical or economic damage). Contra Epstein,
Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 64-65 (questioning characterization of certain establishments as
nuisances in the absence of physical invasion). For a further description of this view, see Ken-
nedy, supra note 10, at 398-400.
71. Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1092-93, 1105-10, 1115-24. See also Michelman, Pollu-
tion as a Tort:A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi'r Costs (Book Review), 80 YALE L.J. 647,
670-73 (1971) (discussing the costs involved with each rule). This distinction has become standard
in the economic analysis of law. See, e.g, Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Enti-
tlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 passim
(1979) (considering the relative merits of each approach).
72. Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1092, 1105.
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the payment of an objectively determined amount of compensation.73
In this framework, "ownership" of the entitlement is not coextensive
with control, particularly when the entitlement is protected by a liabil-
ity rule. For example, even though the farmer in the Coase Theorem
has possession or control of his land, he does not have total dominion
over it (as Epstein would desire) if either a property or liability rule
exists in favor of the rancher or if the farmer has an entitlement pro-
tected only by a liability rule. If a property rule or a liability rule ex-
isted in favor of the rancher, the farmer would not have complete
dominion over his land in the absence of a bribe or a payment to the
rancher. If an entitlement protected only by a liability rule existed in
favor of the farmer, he would always be subject to a possible "trump"
of his activities upon the payment of an objectively-determined fee by
the rancher.
b. Causation:'74 While causation is the linchpin of Epstein's the-
ory in that it joins damage to responsibility, once the reciprocity as-
sumption of the Coase Theorem is accepted, causation plays only a
secondary role.75 This happens in several ways. First, causation is no
longer necessarily linked to individual acts. Calabresi argues that lia-
bility should not be determined on a case-by-case basis; rather, liability
should be placed on that category of persons that is the cheapest cost
avoider.76
Thus, rather than individual acts, groups of activities are consid-
ered77 to identify the party that should bear the losses. Individual
acts--such as the rancher's cows eating the farmer's corn-are deemed
reciprocal because the cause in any given case is no longer necessarily
73. Id at 1092, 1105-06.
74. Some of the points in this discussion about cause were originally made in Borgo, Causal
Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 452-55 (1979).
75. Id See also COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 6 & n.8, 131-97 (causation is not
used as a means of imposing moral blameworthiness, but instead is subordinated to the use of tort
theory to influence social conduct); Concerning Cause, supra note 54, at 106-08 ("cause" used as
guise for social goals). Another example of treating cause from an end-state perspective is found
in Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope ofLiabilily in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 463 (1980).
76. CosTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 255-59. Contra Epstein, Intentional Harms,
supra note 19, at 441 ("[A]s a substantive matter, the tort law should be seen as a system of
corrective justice that looks to the conduct, broadly defined, of the parties to the case with a view
toward the protection of individual liberty and private property.") (emphasis added).
77. CosTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 104, 114-19, 274-77. See also Michelman, supra
note 71, at 656-57 & n.19 (agreeing with Calabresi that in order to exert effective deterrent pres-
sures, liability rules must speak in terms of classes of activities).
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determinative.7" The connection between acts and damage in a partic-
ular case becomes relevant only insofar as it provides empirical support
for determining the implementation of end-state goals.79
Second, the focus need no longer be solely retroactive.80 Once
end-state goals are considered, the relevant inquiry becomes the rela-
tionship between the status quo and the preferred end-state. Past oc-
currences are important for the information they provide on how best
to achieve the end-state goals. Thus, the role for cause in this frame-
work is not the retrospective re-creation of discrete past events, but
rather the assessment of past data to predict the proper means to attain
instrumental goals. Thus in this sense as well, cause in individual cases
is "reciprocal" in the Coasean sense. From the perspective of imple-
menting end-state goals, the retrospective cause of an event in an indi-
vidual case by itself is of no greater importance than the retrospective
cause in any other individual case. The importance of each is judged
instead by the information it provides for implementing the desired
end-state. By reference to the end-state, the cause of one individual
past event is reciprocal, that is, treated equally with, the cause of any
other individual past event.
c. Moral responsibility: In Epstein's theory of torts, causation is
linked to moral standards. If a person acts and, because of his act, the
person or property of another is damaged, he is prima facie responsi-
ble. With the Coase Theorem, however, this changes in three ways.
First, an overt act is not a prerequisite to responsibility." Liability
might be imposed in part because one party has better information
about avoiding accidents or can more easily correct mistakes in the ini-
tial assignment of liability. 2 Only factors relevant to implementation
78. COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 256.
79. Thus in his most recent treatment of the topic, Calabresi begins by setting out four goals
for torts-loss spreading, distributional equity, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. The
role of "cause" is then assessed in terms of these four goals. Concerning Cause, supra note 54, at
73-91.
80. COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 239-65; Concerning Cause, supra note 54, at 73-
91. See also Borgo, supra note 74, at 453-54 (characterizing economic analysis as forward-looking
since it implies that a tort action is not concerned with the harm that occurred but rather with cost-
benefit analysis); Michelman, supra note 71, at 656 (discussing Calabresi's emphasis on prospec-
tive rules).
81. For instance, in the example used in the Coase Theorem, if an entitlement exists in favor
of the rancher, the farmer can be said to be liable even though he was passive. Contra Epstein,
Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 166-67 (volitional act prerequisite to liability).
82. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 135-97 (describing cheapest cost avoider
analysis).
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of end-state goals are considered; particularly acts (or omissions) are
not germane. Second, responsibility may be placed on a group rather
than just on an individual basis.83 Classes of activities may be used for
purposes of assigning liability. Third, and most important, liability is
not associated with moral shortcomings. 4 Instead, liability generally
follows because of a party's superior ability to fulfill a role made im-
portant by the end-state goal, such as being the cheapest cost avoider,
the best collector of information, or the best briber.8 5 Commonsense
"moral" standards or individual shortcomings are not invoked as a rea-
son to impose liability. Calabresi, for example, rejects "fault" as a
dominant principle in deciding the assignment of liability.
8 6
C. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE
EPSTEIN/CALABRESI DEBATE
The debate between Epstein and Calabresi, although initially framed
in terms of reciprocity or causation, is in part a debate about the appro-
priate use of certain psychological constructs. Epstein must reject the
principle of reciprocity not only because it places cause in a secondary
role, but also because it is ultimately incompatible with his use of reifi-
cation and his linkage of causation to responsibility. Correspondingly,
Calabresi's tort theory, because it accepts the principle of reciprocity,
accepts not only a different argument about causation, but an entire set
of complementary psychological constructs. Thus, one can view the
controversy about the reciprocity assumption as a deeper dispute about
the use of particular psychological constructs in legal discourse.
Before the significance of the use of these constructs can be under-
stood, particularly with respect to the Coase Theorem itself, three
threshold questions must be addressed. First, why does each contrast-
ing position cluster around a particular group of constructs? For exam-
ple, why does reification tend to be used along with cause and personal
responsibility? Second, why do Epstein's constructs tend to be incom-
patible with those used in the Coase Theorem? Third, why do Ep-
stein's constructs--reification, cause, and personal responsibility-tend
to be associated with common sense and intuition? The next section
83. Id at 244-65.
84. COSTS OF AccmENTS, supra note 54, at 296. Contra Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note
19, at 168 & nAB (the argument that the proposition "W hit B" should be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of liability "depends upon 'a deep sense of [early] common law morality that one
who hurts another should compensate him' ") (quoting Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 1401, 1412 (1961)).
85. CosTS OF ACCiDENT, supra note 54, at 134-97.
86. Id at 239-308.
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will explore the insight that the branch of developmental psychology
represented by the work of Jean Piaget might provide for these
questions.
II. THE WORLD OF THE CHILD-PIAGET'S THEORY AND
THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF REALITY,
CAUSALITY, AND OBLIGATION
Adults often assume that children are merely smaller, weaker, and less
intelligent versions of themselves. The world of the child, however, is
marked by a progression through distinct cognitive stages. The rela-
tionship between this development and the acquisition of knowledge in
children has been studied by the developmental psychologist Jean
Piaget. 7 Piaget's theory-which has been termed "genetic epistemol-
ogy'' 8 -holds that "knowledge is actively constructed through the
knower's self-regulated interaction with the environment." 9
The purpose of this section is to examine the work of Piaget, in
particular his earlier studies of the development of moral judgment and
conceptions of causality in children, for findings that may aid in under-
standing the debate over the Coase Theorem represented by the disa-
greement between Epstein and Calabresi discussed above. In
particular, Piaget's theories will be used to describe why arguments for
and against the Coase Theorem appear to be characterized by reliance
on the incompatible psychological constructs discussed in the previous
section.90
A brief caveat is in order, however. Piaget's work consists of both
87. Piaget's theories have been further developed by other writers. A distinction has been
recognized between Piaget's theory and Piagetian theory. Bearison, You Gotta Have an Epistemol-
ogy. . . (Book Review), 27 CONTEMP. PSYCHOLOGY 682, 682 (1982). This Article's brief review
of this branch of developmental psychology will generally be limited to the works of Piaget. For a
review of some of the works of other writers, see infra note 90.
88. See, eg., Bearison, supra note 87, at 682.
89. Id Piaget's theories have been interpreted by some subsequent writers to be applicable
to the thinking of adults as well as children. For example, John Flavell has stated that "Piaget has
. . . for a long time freely conceded that not all 'normal' adults, even within one culture, end up at
a common genetic level; adults will show adult thought only in those content areas in which they
have been socialized." J. FLAVELL, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JEAN PiAGET 20
(1963) (citing Piaget, Psycho-PNlagogie et Mentalit Enantine, 1928 . PSYCHOL. NORM. PATH. 25,
31-60). See also id at 41 ("Piaget has also described in considerable detail a general conception
about the nature of intellectual fmctioning. He has tried to uncover the basic and irreducible
properties of cognitive adaptation which hold true at all developmental levels.") (emphasis in
original).
90. A good, brief summary of Piagetian theory, by Piaget, is J. PIAGEr & B. INHELDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD (1969). Other accessible works summarizing Piaget's work include:
R. BEARD, AN OUTLINE OF PIAGET'S DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR STUDENTS AND
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a descriptive component, which focuses on the basic features of human
thought, and a normative component, which suggests that certain fea-
tures are more developed (and thus preferable) than others because of
their association with certain supposedly sequential and orderly stages
of development. While these two components cannot be totally sepa-
rated, this Article's focus is on the desciiptive rather than normative
aspect of Piaget's work.91 No claim will be made that a necessary cor-
TEACHERS (1969); J. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (1977) (a general survey that includes
work by Piaget as well as other researchers).
The purpose of this section is not to provide a definitive account of the psychological struc-
tures of human thought. Neither is its purpose to provide a complete evaluation of the various
academic disputes within this general area. Rather, the purpose is only to point out those features
of the developmental psychology of Piaget that support the general arguments made in this Arti-
cle. This section focuses on the work of Piaget because of his pioneering and influential role in
developmental psychology.
Recent research in psychology and sociology that more thoroughly develops and refines some
of Piaget's work has given rise to the subdiscipline of attribution theory. This theory centers on
the everyday perceptions of events by persons by addressing how people explain causes of behav-
ior and assess responsibility--two areas which correspond to Piaget's treatment of causation and
liability. This addition to Piaget's theories reinforces the idea that commonsense thinking has
definite structures and dispositions. Major works in attribution theory include: F. HEiDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); H. KELLEY, CAUSAL SCHEMATA AND THE
ATTRIBUTION PROCESS (1972); K. SHAVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ATrRIUuTION PROCESSES
(1975). See also Kelley, The Process of CausalAttribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 108 (1973)
("[lit is precisely common sense with which attribution theory is concerned."); Ross, The Intuitive
Psychologist andHis Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attributlon Process, in COGNITIVE THEORIES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337, 338 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978) ("[Attribution theory] deals with the
'naive psychology' of the 'man in the street' as he interprets his own behaviors and the actions of
others."). This body of work reinforces the idea that commonsense or intuitionistic thinking has
structures that often run counter to formalistic methods of analysis usually associated with "ra-
tional" or "scientific" thought such as statistical analysis. Particularly relevant studies include
Kruglanski, Hamel, Maides & SchwartzAttribution Theory as a Special Case of Lay Epistemology,
in 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRmUTION RESEARCH 299 (J. Harvey, W. Ickes & R. Kidd eds. 1978);
Ross, supra; Ross, Some Afterthoughts on the Intuitive Psychologist, in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN
SOCI PSYCHOLOGY, supra, at 385; Tversky, Features of Similarily, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 327
(1977); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sc. 1124
(1974).
Recent attempts to assess the importance of this work for legal analysis include: Attributions
in the Criminal Justice System, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 285 (1978); Lloyd-Bostock, The Ordinary
Man, and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and Responsibility, 42 MOD. L. REV. 143 (1979).
91. Piaget makes several normative assertions in his theory. In particular, he claims that
later developmental stages are in some way "higher" than or preferable to earlier stages. J.
PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 313-25, 397-98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD]. This aspect of Piaget's theory is further developed by Law-
rence Kohlberg. See Kohlberg, From Is To Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and
Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTE-
MOLOGY 151, 180-81 (T. Mischel ed. 1971) (the psychological theory as to why a child moves from
stage to stage is essentially the same as the philosophical theory of why a higher stage is preferable
to a lower stage); Kohlberg, Yhe Claim to Moral Adequacy of the Highest Stage of Moral Judg-
ment, 70 J. PHIL. 630, 630 (1973) (a "higher or later stage of moral judgment is 'objectively'
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relation exists between the use of particular psychological constructs
and preferred moral or political arguments. For purposes of the argu-
ment to be developed in the following pages, it is sufficient that Piaget's
work is generally descriptive of the various psychological constructs
present in human thought, and that some general shift in emphasis oc-
curs over time, even if this shift may not be as complete as Piaget him-
self might suggest. This section will briefly review how Piaget might
analyze the three psychological constructs-reification, causation, and
moral realism-that are present in theories such as Epstein's that reject
the Coase Theorem, but not present in those theories that accept the
validity of the theorem.
A. REIFICATION-THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF REALITY
Piaget's work suggests that reification can be traced to the development
of the conception of reality in the child. In his early work, The Child's
Conception of Physical Causality,92 Piaget set out to test the validity of
preferable to or more adequate than an earlier stage ofjudgment according to certain moral crite-
ria") (emphasis in original).
Applying such normative standards to legal theory is inappropriate for two reasons, however.
First, these standards are based on extrapolations from individual behavior, rather than the social
aspects of the use of particular psychological constructs. Both Piaget and Kohlberg fail to con-
front either the reality of the exercise of power, or the existence of social structures apart from
individual behavior, such as the interaction of individuals competing for limited resources. Thus,
Piaget and Kohlberg's application of the normative aspects of psychological theory to legal
thought is necessarily incomplete. See Goodpaster, Kohlbergian Theory: A Philosophical Counter-
invitation, 92 ETHICS 491, 494 (1982) (Kohlberg's theory of moral development does not "make
out a clear case for relevance to normative ethics."); Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New
Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REv. 487, 489-90 (1980) (the psychological literature obscures criti-
cal issues of lawyering and legality by celebrating the private and the personal at the expense of
the public and the social); Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood- Conceptions of Child Development
and Social Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 38, 52-71 (Summer 1975) (developmental psy-
chology neglects influence of social and cultural contexts).
A second problem with the application of normative standards to legal theory is that it fails to
account for the possibility that distinct forms of thought develop within groups. For example, it
may be that lawyers tend to favor an intuitionistic mode of analysis, whereas economists favor one
more consistent with the Coase Theorem. A normative standard preferring one method of analy-
sis to another would ignore the group dynamics involved. For discussions of this social element of
group thought, see B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 80-128 (1976) (middle
class America has been subject to professionalization, creating a pattern of thinking among
groups); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLuTIONS 111-35 (2d ed. 1970) (when a
particular paradigm changes, it causes the professional community to view the world differently).
Thus, this Article does not use Piaget's theories to argue that the Coase Theorem is norma-
tively superior to theories of law that reject Coase. Instead, the Article's thesis is that by using
Piaget in a descriptive fashion, we can explain why there appears to be an unwillingness among
lawyers and laypeople to accept the Coase Theorem. Once this psychological barrier is recog-
nized, a coherent normative debate can take place on the merits of the theorem.
92. J. PiL~ET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY (1930) [hereinafter cited
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the competing theories that knowledge is a priori or, in the alternative,
that events in the world impress themselves directly on the mind. In-
stead of confirming either of these two theories completely, Piaget pos-
ited a compromise, asserting a constant interaction between existing
operations of the mind (operations) and the events of the world
(causality):
The truth, in short, lies half-way between empiricism and apri-
orism: intellectual evolution requires that both mind and environ-
ment should make their contribution. This combination has, during
the primitive stages, the semblance of confusion, but as time goes on,
the mind adapts itself to the world, and transforms it in such a way
that the world can adapt itself to the mind.93
This process, according to Piaget, is a general move from complete
subjectivity toward increasingly greater objectivity. In the earliest
stages, the world and the mind of the child are one. No distinction is
made between events of the mind and events of the world;94 these two
universes collapse into a single reality, each contributing to the other.9
The external world shares the characteristics of the self, such as con-
sciousness and purpose. As the child progresses from these early
stages, these two universes gradually begin to separate into somewhat
distinct conceptual entities-the objective and the subjective.96 The
child begins to structure the external, objective world as he becomes
conscious of its existence apart from his own subjective universe. How-
ever, this process of separation is never quite complete:
At each step in the process of dissociation these two terms evolve in
the sense of the greatest divergence, but they are never in the child
(nor in the adult for that matter) entirely separate. From our present
point of view, therefore, there is never complete objectivity: at every
stage there remain in the conception of nature what we might call
"adherences", fragments of internal experience which still cling to
the external world.97
Adherences are reifying, in that abstract internal concepts are external-
ized into concrete form.98 One form of adherence important to the
present discussion is animism. Through animism, the child "endow[s]
as CHILD'S CONCEPTION]. Later developments are collected in J. PAGEr, UNDERSTANDING CAU-
sALITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNDERSTANDING].
93. CHILD'S CONCEPTION, supra note 92, at 258.
94. See id at 242.
95. Id at 256.
96. Id at 242.
97. Id at 244.
98. Piaget posits five basic types of adherences:
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things with consciousness and life."99 Inanimate objects are invested
with feelings or with the ability to move; in short, they are seen as dif-
fering from humans only in appearance. Similar adherences related to
beliefs are prevalent for the child, who is "quite incapable of distin-
guishing between thought and the things thought about."'1"° Names are
situated in objects, dreams are localized in the eyes, and later in the
head, and "the child believes that he thinks with his mouth.. . and
that these words themselves form part of the external things."10'
Reification is a natural stage in the development of the child. Yet
because total objectivity is never attained in adults,"0 2 the reification
tendency will be incorporated into the reasoning of adults."0 3 The de-
gree to which adults reify will vary with the individual, because not all
adults will achieve the same development. Some will, for reasons such
as age,' °4 stress,10 5 or background, 06 be more animistic than others.
1. Dynamicparticpation: "The sun and moon follow us...; things around us notice
us and obey us.. "
2. 4nimism: "Mhe child endow[s] things with consciousness and life."
3. Artificialism: "[Things. . . take notice of man and are made for man; everything
about them is willed and intentional, everything is organized for the good of men."
4. Finalism: "[Tihe deep and stubborn finalism of the child shows with what difficulty
external reality frees itself from schemas due to internal and physical experience."
5. Notion offorce: "[Things make efforts, and their powers imply an internal and sub-
stantial energy analogous to our own muscular force."
Id at 244-45.
99. Id at 245.
100. Id at 242. James Sully, a predecessor of Piaget, provides a particularly revealing
description of this tendency to reify, that is, to confuse the internal and external worlds. In
describing the child's view of the natural world, Sully remarks:
At first, that is to say after the child has had experience enough at seeing and touching
things at the same time to know that the two commonly go together, he believes that all
which he sees is tangible or substantial. Thus he will try to touch shadows, sunlight
dancing on the wall, and picture forms. This tendency to "reify," or make things of, his
visual impressions shows itself in pretty forms, as when the little girl M., one year eleven
months old, "gathered sunlight in her hands and put it on her face."
J. SULLY, STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD 95 (1895).
101. CHILD'S CONCEPTION, supra note 92, at 242.
102. Piaget remarks that the differentiation "remain[s] uncompleted at the close of childhood
and survivels] throughout the intellectual development of the adult." Id at 252. See also supra
text accompanying note 97 (process of separation never becomes complete).
103. See J. PIAGET, THE CHILD AND REALITY 51 (1973) (intellectual development in child
and adolescent is integrative, that is, "structures constructed at a given age become an integral part
of the structures of the following age").
104. Piaget posits that animism may completely disappear as the child develops. See CHILD'S
CONCEPTION, supra note 92, at 24546 (describing the process of evolution that leads the child
from a dynamic to a mechanical view of the world). Other experimenters, however, have found
significant amounts of animistic thinking in adults. See, ag., Crannel, The Responses of College
Students to a Questionnaire of Animistic Thinking, 78 Sci. MON. 54 (1954); Dennis & Mallenger,
Animism & Related Tendencies in Senescence, 4 J. GERONTOLOGY 218, 219-20 (1949) (finding ani-
mistic thinking in people ages 70 and over).
105. Piaget speculated that during times of stress, people regress to earlier stages of thought
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Thus, the presence of reification in mature thought is understandable,
for reification is linked to the development of human thought, and is a
process that adults as well as children experience. Its presence can be
seen in theories that reject the Coase Theorem's reciprocity assumption.
Epstein based his rejection of reciprocity on the argument that a right
exists in one party in every case to obtain a favorable judgment from
the court. Thus, the harm inflicted on that person by the opposing
party is not reciprocal with the harm inflicted on the other party by
causing him to alter his behavior; instead the latter harm is justified by
the former.10 7 Thus, the allocation of liability is manifested in one
party in every case. Under Coasean analysis, however, reciprocity is
accepted in part because reification is not present. The goal of the sys-
tem is a broad, end-state objective of efficient resource allocation and
risk deterrence; this does not necessarily dictate the existence of a right
and wrong party in each case. Liability is allocated so that the end-
state goals are met. The concreteness of a case-by-case analysis is
eliminated. 08
B. CAUSATION-THE ATTRACTION OF MOVEMENT AND FORCE
For Epstein, causation is the linchpin of the law of torts. Without it, a
prima facie case of liability cannot be established. 10 9 Moreover, when
two people simultaneously act on each other, such as in a car collision,
division of liability is measured by the amount of force released.by
each.110 In contrast, the Coase Theorem dismisses force as a relevant
concern in assigning liability for a tort. For example, Calabresi's
cheapest cost-avoider model drops the use of force and movement."'
Thus, for Coasean analysis, force and movement are subordinate to the
end-state goals the theory seeks to advance.
See, e.g., THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD, supra note 91, at 136-37 (when an adult is
forced to solve someone else's problems rather than his own, he often reverts to moral principles
he has discarded for himself).
106. Piaget speculates that adults in some societies may not advance beyond certain stages of
cognitive development:
In particular, it is quite possible, and this is ther impression we have from known ethno-
graphical work, that in many societies, adult thought does not go beyond the level of
"concrete" operations, and therefore does not reach that of propositional operations
which develop between the ages of twelve and fifteen in our milieus.
J. PIAGET, PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 61-62 (1971).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
109. See Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 160-89.
110. Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note 19, at 179-80.
111. The relevant category for loss spreading becomes groups of activities rather than acts.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
1983] THE COASE THEOREM
Piaget's work on causality contributes to an understanding of the
attraction of each of these views. Whereas the decline in reification in
later developmental stages is associated with a greater external applica-
tion of internal conceptions and thought processes, notions of causality
demonstrate a shift toward greater internal comprehension of external
phenomena. Thus, the child's perception of causality parallels his per-
ception of reality. The two develop simultaneously, each influencing
the other.
Two of Piaget's findings are particularly relevant. First, causal ex-
planation-just as development in general-moves from irreversibility
(in that the child cannot distinguish the physical event from the factors
that caused the event to occur) in the earliest stages to reversibility (the
ability to make this distinction) in the more advanced stages. I2 Piaget
posits no less than seventeen distinct types of causal relation in child
thought" 3 and sums up this entire development by stating that "[t]hree
processes seem . . . to characterise this evolution: the desubjectifica-
tion of causality, the formation of series in time, and the progressive
reversibility of the systems of cause and effect." '114 The distinction be-
tween the earlier and later stages is that notions of causality shift from
extreme irreversibility to an increasing recognition of the concept of
reversibility." 5 The early stages of this process are strikingly similar to
the positions of Epstein, who emphasizes the nonreciprocal or irrevers-
112. CHILD'S CONCEPTION, supra note 92, at 269-71.
113. Id at 258-67. These types range from "phenomenistic causality," at the less advanced
stages, in which two facts are regarded as connected by a relation of causality merely because they
are given together in perception (e.g., a fire set alongside an engine is regarded as the cause of
movement). Id at 259-60. The more advanced stages involve such types as "mechanical causal-
ity" (e.g., the wind pushes the clouds) that exhibit the collaboration of internal and external forces.
Id at 263-64.
114. Id at 267.
115. Id at 270. As Piaget explains:
The progress from irreversibility to reversibility is thus continuous. This process,
moreover, seems extremely natural if we bear in mind the manner in which the idea of
reality grows up in the child. For the primitive universe is both strewn with subjective
adherences and very near to immediate perception. Now, in so far as it is tinged with the
child's subjectivity, this universe is irreversible: the flow of consciousness, psychological
time, the whims of desires and actions which follow one another without order or repeti-
tion-all these things are projected in their entirety into the external world. Similarly, in
as much as it is near to immediate perception, the child's universe is irreversible, for
perception never shows us the same sun nor the same trajectory, nor the same move-
ments twice. Events cannot happen over again in the same way. It is the mind that
builds up reversible sequences underneath perception. To the extent that the child's uni-
verse is removed from these constructions and close to the immediately given, it is irre-
versible. Thus the advance towards reversibility shown by the development of child
causality follows exactly the same lines as those underlying the processes defined in con-
nection with the idea of reality.
Id at 271.
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ible nature of causation in torts. Calabresi, on the other hand, builds
on the Coase Theorem and accepts the reciprocal or reversible aspects
of activities.
The second aspect of Piaget's work relevant to the debate over the
Coase Theorem is his explanation of the primacy of the earlier, irre-
versible causal explanations. In other words, why do the notions of
mechanical thrust or pull seem more elementary than, say, those of
heat, even though they occur no more often? At least a partial answer
can be gleaned from Piaget's recent work, Understanding Causality. 16
What gives primacy to the concept of movement over other less obvi-
ous causal explanations is its early use by the child to begin his differ-
entiation from external reality. A child's first interaction with objects,
and also his own body, is by movement. He pushes, grasps, or throws
objects near him. The actions are irreversible. From this interaction
with objects the child begins to develop schemes, which later are used
to build operations."1 7 Most significantly, however, the schemes and
the causal acts that give rise to them are not differentiated, as are oper-
ations and causality in later stages. Because the child is unable to dif-
ferentiate the prelogical scheme (internal) from the causal movement
(external), the development of operations, where differentiation begins,
is delayed."1 The development of operations requires reversibility, yet
the earliest logical schemes are irreversible.
Force, movement, and action thus give rise to the earliest logical
structures in the child's development. The early experiences involving
irreversible actions form the first states of cognitive development and
are incorporated into later stages. Because of this, individual motions,
force, and movement tend to be perceived as more basic and thus more
attuned to common sense and ordinary understanding. Reversibility is
not possible until later stages of causal relation are reached.
116. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92.
117. See J. PIAGET, supra note 106, at 12-73.
118. See UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 26. Piaget goes on to explain that:
When the subject pours a liquid from one container into another, modifies the form of an
object or the spatial arrangement of a collection, these actions remain all the more dis-
tant from the rule of reversible operations the more they appear to the subject to be of a
causal nature, to the extent that causality introduces new effects that are not preformed
and that modify the object without our being able in advance to impose limits on these
transformations, which will be the case only when this causality becomes an attribution
of operations. In other words, since most causal actions are irreversible, for an action to
be internalized in an operation it is necessary for it to be sufficiently differentiated from
causal actions or from the causal aspect of actions in general; otherwise, undifferentia-
tion will constitute a delaying factor.
Id at 115.
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C. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY-THE CONNECTION OF
CAUSATION AND LIABILITY
For Epstein, causation alone creates a prima facie case of liability.119
Liability, in turn, is based on the notion of moral responsibility for
wrongful conduct.' 20 In contrast, Calabresi does not link causation of
liability with moral sanction. For him, 'justice" considerations may
alter a particular torts decision, but they are not initially fused with that
decision.12'
The Moral Judgment of the Child,12 2 one of Piaget's earliest works,
suggests several reasons for the attraction of linking causation to obli-
gation. Piaget analyzed children's attitudes toward game rules'23 and
stealing and lying, 24 as well as explored children's notions ofjustice. 25
In addition, and of significance here, he studied their attitudes toward
clumsiness-the child's earliest exposure to torts.126 His method was to
tell children stories that included both intentional and accidental be-
havior by children and to ask in which story the child was "naughtier."
For example, he told the children a story involving clumsiness where
the act was accidental, or even well-intentioned, but resulted in consid-
erable material damage. 27 He then told another story in which the
damage done was less, but the act was ill-intentioned. 128 He found that
the younger children judged the acts by external results rather than
internal intent, 29 a tendency he termed "objective responsibility."' 30 A
119. See supra text accompanying note 109.
120. See supra text accompanying note 27.
121. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 54, at 24-26, 293-300.
122. THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD, supra note 91.
123. Id at 13-108.
124. Id at 109-96.
125. Id at 197-325.
126. Id at 121-38.
127. One such story was the following:
A little boy who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He goes into
the dining room. But behind the door there was a chair, and on the chair there was a
tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known that there was all this behind the
door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang go the fifteen cups and they all
get broken!
Id at 122.
128. One such story was the following:
Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry. One day when his mother was
out he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on to a chair and
stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high up and he couldn't reach it and have
any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and
broke.
Id
129. Id at 123-33.
130. Id at 117.
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child who broke fifteen cups by accident was deemed "naughtier" than
a second child who broke one cup intentionally. Consequences rather
than intent determined liability.' 3 1 Piaget's explanation for this phe-
nomenon is particularly relevant:
We can therefore put forward the hypothesis that judgments of
objective responsibility occurring in the course of our interrogatory
were based upon a residue left by experiences that had really been
lived through. Although new material may since have enriched the
child's moral consciousness and enabled him to discern the nature of
subjective responsibility, these earlier experiences are sufficient, it
would seem, to constitute a permanent foundation of moral realism
which appears on each fresh occasion.'
32
Moreover, judgment of others also tends to be more severe than judg-
ment of self.
133
The use of an objective conception of responsibility is part of a
stage Piaget terms moral realism, which he describes as "the tendency
which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-
subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of
the circumstances in which the individual may find himself."' 134 Along
with objective responsibility, moral realism is also associated with a
conformance to rules regardless of content.1 35 Piaget suggests moral
realism follows from the general features of child thought:
The first group of factors that tend to explain moral realism is
therefore based on one of the most spontaneous features of child
thought-realism in general. For the child is a realist, and this
means that in almost every domain he tends to consider as external,
to "reify". .. the contents of his mind ...
Being therefore a realist in every domain, it is not surprising that
the child should from the first "realize" and even "reify" the moral
laws which he obeys. It is forbidden to lie, to steal, to spoil things,
etc.-all, so many laws which will be conceived as existing in them-
selves, independently of the mind, and in consequence independently
of individual circumstances and of intentions.' 36
131. Id at 12426.
132. Id at 136.
133. Id at 136-37, 183.
134. Id at 111. See generally id at 174-96 (outlining conclusions drawn from Piaget's study
of moral realism in the child).
135. Id at 111.
136. I.d at 187-88.
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Thus, as with reification and causation, the connection of liability with
causation is also related to a distinct Piagetian stage. Under an earlier
stage, liability can be imposed irrespective of any moral responsibility
for the act, whereas the later stages require some notion of fault for the
imposition of liability.
D. PIAGET'S THEORY AND THE EPSTEIN/CALABRESI DEBATE
The three questions raised at the beginning of this section-why reifica-
tion, causation, and moral responsibility tend to be associated with one
another, why Epstein's constructs are incompatible with Calabresi's,
and why Epstein's constructs are perceived as more "basic"--can now
be addressed. First, the connection between reification, cause, and
moral responsibility is the result of an interplay of developmental
forces. Reification tends to be easily associated with causation and, in
turn, with moral responsibility because of an overall connection be-
tween the stages of development. 137 While there is a gradual transfor-
mation from one stage of development to another, the earlier stage is
never entirely eliminated from the mind. Thus, the prior stages still
appear in later stages of development, even though the results the prior
stages produce are inconsistent with those of the later stages. These
connections between stages, although lessened somewhat, do not disap-
pear from adult thinking.
Second, the incompatibility of the constructs used by Epstein with
those used by Calabresi is understandable once the source of each is
linked to a different stage of development. Within the Piagetian frame-
work, not only do such constructs mark different stages but they also
represent larger competing constructs. Causation and reciprocity, for
example, do not mix well because causation represents a stage prior to
reciprocity.
Third, the use of Epstein's constructs is likely to be accepted as
somehow more "basic" not only because Epstein's constructs corre-
spond to earlier stages of cognitive development, but also because they
are integrated into later stages of adult thinking. Thus, Epstein's con-
structs are present in every stage of cognitive development. Making an
appeal to the common sense of ordinary people stresses such factors
because of the greater presence of such constructs in everyday thought.
137. Based on the analysis of Piaget's theory above, the relation of the three concepts can be
schematized in the following manner.
Reification--confusing internal with external;
Causation (and primacy of force)-confusing external with internal;
Moral realism--confusing internal with external.
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On the other hand, the use of Calabresi's constructs, and his concomi-
tant rejection of those of Epstein, is likely to be seen as less basic, and
thus less intuitively appealing. This is because Calabresi's constructs
correspond to later stages of cognitive development that are less famil-
iar and also in conflict with the more basic constructs to which Ep-
stein's theory appeals. However, this distinction does not mean that
one theory is normatively superior to the other. Instead, it simply ex-
plains why one is generally seen as more intuitively attractive than the
other.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURES AND LEGAL THEORY
The first two sections of this Article establish several propositions.
First, the Epstein/Calabresi debate about the reciprocity assumption of
the Coase Theorem, although typically described as merely one about
causation, is a broader dispute about the use of sets of psychological
constructs such as reification, causation, and moral realism in norma-
tive legal argument. Second, the use of these constructs by Epstein and
Calabresi leads to the respective rejection and acceptance of the Coase
Theorem by each. Finally, the existence of these psychological con-
structs, and the relationship between them, correspond in general to
Piaget's description of the development of human thought.
The applicability of these psychological structures is not limited,
however, to the current debate in tort theory. Instead, the presence of
these constructs in an individual's legal argument can explain his reac-
tion to broader issues in legal theory. The purpose of this section is to
demonstrate the applicability of the psychological framework devel-
oped in sections I and II to two other areas of legal thought. The first is
the psychological structure of common-law thought in general. The ve-
hicle used to develop this theme is the recent delineation by Bruce Ack-
erman, in Private Property and the Constitution,3 ' of ordinary
observing and scientific policymaking as distinct modes of thought in
the present legal culture. Ackerman also details the influence of these
concepts on the jurisprudence of the takings clause. Significantly, the
psychological structures of ordinary observing and scientific poli-
cymaking are the same as those found in the debate between Epstein
and Calabresi on the Coase Theorem. Thus, the same psychological
constructs that animated the Epstein/Calabresi debate about causation
138. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35. For an earlier work discussing common-law thought, see
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrTION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) (contrasting the use
of common sense and wisdom by earlier judges in deciding appeals-the "Grand Style"--with the
current appellate style of eliminating common sense and relying on rules-the "Formal Style").
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are also present in the analysis of the takings clause by ordinary ob-
servers and scientific policymakers. In addition, Ackerman associates
ordinary observing with traditional legal scholarship and scientific poli-
cymaking with the Coase Theorem (along with other types of analysis).
This suggests that the psychological structure of common-law thought
may be more readily explained than previously recognized.
This section also will demonstrate the applicability of the analysis
developed in sections I and II to the recent debate between Mark Kel-
man and Matthew Spitzer/Elizabeth Hoffman over empirical proof of
the Coase Theorem. This debate represents another example of the
descriptive power of the psychological structure of the Coase Theorem.
A. PRIV4TE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION-THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF ORDINARY OBSERVING AND SCIENTIFIC POLICYMAKING
AND SOME SPECULATIONS ON COMMON-LAW
THOUGHT
1. The Nature of Ordinary Observing and Scientfc Policymaking
In Private Property and the Constitution, Bruce Ackerman reflects on
current legal thought and its influence in the jurisprudence of the tak-
ings clause. Instead of one type of legal thought, Ackerman finds "two
fundamentally different ways of thinking about law."139 One variety of
legal thought Ackerman terms "ordinary observing." The legal analy-
sis of the ordinary observer relies on two fundamental assumptions.
The first is that good legal analysis cannot be divorced from the plain
talk of nonlawyers.14 Once stripped of the technicalities generated by
adversarial confrontation, the legal dialogue of the ordinary observer is
grounded in the proposition that "nonlegal ways of speaking can be
expected to reveal the basic structure and animating concerns of legal
analysis." '141 The second assumption relied upon by the ordinary ob-
server is that "law should support dominant social expectations as these
are expressed in ordinary language."' 14 2 Thus, the ordinary observer
has been described as one who "aligns himself with laymen in two
senses: substantively, he demands laws that fulfill lay expectations;
procedurally, he demands legal analysis that is comprehensible and fa-
miliar to the educated nonlawyer."' 143
139. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 4.
140. Id at 10.
141. Id
142. Id at 94.
143. Campisano, Ordinary Observing and Utilitarian Policymaking in the Internal Revenue
Code, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 788 (1982) (footnote omitted).
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A second mode of legal thought Ackerman terms "scientific poli-
cymaking." For the scientific policymaker, two different assumptions
are made about language and legitimation. First, the scientific poli-
cymaker rejects the idea that the language of the laymen necessarily
provides the best framework for legal dialogue. 144 Rather than being
concerned with how laymen use similar-sounding terms, the scientist
"conceives the distinctive constituents of legal discourse to be a set of
technical concepts whose meanings are set in relation to one another by
clear definitions."'' 45 Second, rather than being concerned with a case-
by-case method of decisionmaking, the scientific policymaker evaluates
decisions in light of a relatively small number of abstract principles-
what Ackerman terms the "comprehensive view"-that are assumed to
be imputed to the operation of the legal system, whether or not these
principles are in fact consistent with present social practice. 146
After defining these modes of legal thought, Ackerman turns to the
current jurisprudence of the takings clause to illustrate the conflict be-
tween these two approaches in the present legal culture, and to analyze
the implications of the conflict for the future of legal thought. Acker-
man's thesis is that takings law can be understood as the product of a
legal culture in transition. 47 On the one hand, ordinary observing, the
traditional method of analysis in the American legal culture, is less able
to provide a coherent framework for the modern political conceptions
of property and of the role of the state. On the other hand, scientific
policymaking, while potentially able to provide a more modern frame-
work, has yet to be developed fully as a form of legal analysis. As a
result, "the subterranean conflict between the two forms of legal
thought expresses itself on the surface of professional life by the com-
mon perception that takings law is incoherent, its principles altogether
mysterious." 148
2. The Psychology of Ordinary Observing and Scienific Policymaking
From the perspective of developing an understanding of the impor-
tance of the psychology of the Coase Theorem to the present legal cul-
ture, Ackerman's analysis of the takings clause is significant. Ordinary
observing and scientific policymaking, as ideal types, are animated by
144. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 10-11.
145. Id at 10.
146. Id at 11-15.
147. See id at 89, 168-89.
148. Id at 168.
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the same psychological structures present in the Epstein/Calabresi
debate.
a. The psychology of ordinary observing: Ordinary observing,
which Ackerman associates with traditional legal analysis,' 49 uses the
intuitions of the layman as a source of legitimation.15 0 For the ordi-
nary observer, the meaning of the takings clause is to determine, from
the layman's perspective, "whether (a) one of llayman's things (b) has
been taken (c) by the state (d) without [o]rdinary justification."'' If
ordinary intuitions are used for normative legal analysis, however, psy-
chological theory suggests that the resulting method will favor particu-
lar constructs. Predictably, the four elements in the ordinary observer's
analysis of the takings clause are based on notions of reification, causa-
tion, and moral realism.
The first element, "property," is dominated by the idea of reifica-
tion. Ordinary observers generally perceive persons as "the" owner of
property.' 52 For them, "property talk is about relations between people
and things."' 53 As a result, physical control over things is a far more
significant indicia of ownership than abstract claims of ownership that
do not involve immediate possession, such as potential uses of property
or future interests in ownership."'
The second element, "taking," also relies on reification. A taking
occurs for the ordinary observer when one of his things is either trans-
ferred to another person or destroyed without his consent.'5 5 Transfer
without consent emphasizes the subjective (or person) part of reifica-
tion, while destruction without consent emphasizes the objective (or
thing) part of reification. In either case, the ordinary observer treats
ownership as rights in things. Thus it is predictable from the perspec-
tive of Piaget's theory that state action which, even though severe, only
restricts a person's use of one of his things and does not transfer or
destroy it would be problematical for the ordinary observer.'5 6 As
Ackerman notes in one of his examples, regulation requiring the com-
pulsory garaging of all second automobiles to conserve energy is much
149. Id
150. See id at 10-15, 93-97.
151. Id at 116.
152. Seeid at 26-27, 116-45.
153. Id at 244 n.31.
154. Seeid at 116-23, 241 n.24.
t55. See id at 123-36.
156. See id at 136-45.
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more difficult for an ordinary observer to perceive as a "taking" than a
regulation depriving the owner of possession.15 7 Such a result is consis-
tent with the expected features of intuitionistic thought because none of
the aspects of ownership critical from a reification perspective-in par-
ticular, physical possession of a tangible thing-are clearly implicated.
The third element, "by the state," represents, for the ordinary ob-
server, a problem of determining whether the state "caused" the tak-
ing. 158 Even admitted state action is difficult to label a taking for the
ordinary observer if the relationship between the act by the state and
the transfer or destruction of a thing does not comport with an intuitive
sense of causation.159 Thus, an explicit bureaucratic order, 60 a limita-
tion on the present use of land, 1 ' or a physical taking' 62 are all more
likely to be perceived by the ordinary observer as action by the state
157. Id at 137-41. See also id at 252 n.49 (in order to determine whether a taking occurred
when a restriction is placed upon the sale of a layman's artwork, an inquiry into the layman's taste
is required). In part, Ackerman's analysis here was prophetic. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,
64-68 (1979) (prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired eagles was ruled not to be a taking
because it was only a denial of the right of sale).
158. In assessing the "by the state" element, in addition to causation, the ordinary observer
also uses reification and moral realism. First, the "state" exists "in" certain places (such as a
capitol building or state office building) and "in" certain people. The act complained of, thus,
must be by one who clearly "works for" the state. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 148, 242
n.26. Second, in part because the focus of the analysis is on the acts of the "people" who work for
the state, and in part because the state is deemed to have no special role to play in ordering
society, the criteria for determining whether there has been a "taking" by the state is to ask
whether a layman would label the action complained of a "taking" if a private person had done
the same thing.
159. See id at 145-50.
160. See, eg., id at 147-48, 256 n.69 (President Nixon's order to control prices by bureau-
cratic intervention raised the takings issue).
161. See id at 154-55, 247 n.36, 262 n.86. This, for example, includes the problems of non-
conforming use in zoning law.
162. See id at 124-25, 257 n.71. The current strength of this view on the Supreme Court, as
well as an apparent division of the Justices along ordinary observer/scientific policymaking lines,
is evident in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). Six Jus-
tices took the position that a "permanent physical occupation of property" constitutes a taking
"without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner." Id at 3175-76. Emphasizing that "[i]n such a case, the property
owner entertains an historically-rooted expectation of compensation," id at 3179, the majority
stressed the interference with dominion over a physical thing. Id at 3174-77. In contrast, the
three dissenting Justices, showing obvious discomfort with the majority's use of reification, found
the per se takings rule used by the majority to be "uniquely unsuited to the modem urban age."
Id at 3182 (Blackmun, Brennan & White, JJ., dissenting). In a scientific policymaking-like
analysis, the dissent stressed the economic consequences of the government action which, in this
case, may well have increased the economic value of the property owner's interest, even though he
was deprived of a physical portion of his property. Id at 3182-84. This case is also of note
because of the obvious conflict between the majority and the dissent about "property" itself. The
majority seems to treat the owner's interest as dominion over a physical thing while the dissent is
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than regulation of prices in the market,' 63 a limitation on the future
uses of property,' 64 or regulation of third parties. 65
The fourth, and final, element of the takings clause as perceived by
an ordinary observer is that the taking be "without [o]rdinary justifica-
tion." In Ackerman's description of the ordinary observer, even if
property is taken by the state, the taking may be justified if the owner
of the property was using the property in a way inconsistent with the
prevailing expectations of the dominant social institutions.1 66 While
perhaps not as obvious as the use of reification and causation in the
first three elements, the concept of ordinary justification in the fourth
element correlates to the use of moral realism. A defining characteris-
tic of moral realism is the association of moral obligation and physical
regularity with a reified superstructure of values. 67 The result is a rei-
fication of obligation and an endowing of the physical world and of
social institutions with a reified and self-enforcing set of values. Social
or moral standards are perceived to exist in the world. While the use of
moral realism in Epstein's work focuses on the connection between re-
sponsibility and physical regularity, moral realism in the ordinary ob-
server's perception of the takings clause correlates with the assumption
of a dominant, self-enforcing standard of obligation in society. The
ordinary observer judges the propriety of takings against the dominant
expectations of existing social structure. Piaget's theory suggests, how-
ever, that the substance of those standards would conform to the reified
social standards of the dominant groups in society.
In the context of the takings clause, then, the ordinary observer
must compare the actions of the state against those of other supposedly
well-socialized individuals. This not only means that the state is
treated as if its acts were those of a private person, but also that the
standard against which it is judged corresponds to the dominant social
standards that define when a person's property may be taken away be-
cause he "misbehaved." Much like the child who is chastised for using
his things in an immature fashion, the property owner who misuses his
property is denied compensation "[s]ince, from an [o]rdinary
[o]bserver's point of view, it is quite justified to take somebody's thing
more comfortable perceiving the matter as one involving an entitlement protected by a liability
rule.
163. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 146-47.
164. See id at 154-55, 247 nn.36 & 41.
165. See id at 133-34, 250 n.43.
166. See id at 150-56.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
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away from him if it is necessary to stop him acting in a way he should
recognize as socially unacceptable."' 68
The psychological features of ordinary observing thus correspond
to the same constructs that were implicit in Epstein's critique of the
Coase Theorem. Reification, causation, and moral realism form the
implicit psychological structure of the legal arguments. Moreover, a
coordinated use is made of all three constructs even though an ordinary
observer may be appealing to different aspects of the constructs than
does Epstein. In Epstein's argument, reification of rights focuses on
property and personal rights, while Ackerman's description of ordinary
observing, since he is specifically considering the takings clause, focuses
on the use of reification to define property rights. Also, Epstein's use of
moral realism focuses on the association of cause with responsibility,
while Ackerman's use of moral realism focuses on the justification for
taking property. Both, however, make a similar use of causation.
b. The psychology of scientfc policymaking: Scientific poli-
cymaking uses psychological constructs that compete with those used
by ordinary observing. Ackerman develops two varieties of scientific
policymaking, based on the use of utilitarian and Kantian comprehen-
sive views. A common starting point is what Ackerman terms a "scien-
tific" view of property. As opposed to the ordinary view of property as
rights in things, the scientific analysis treats property as relationships
between people with respect to things. 169 From this perspective, the
task of the law "is not to identify 'the' rights of 'the' property owner
through some mysterious intuitive process but to determine in whose
bundle one or another right may best be put."'10 The crucial question
for the scientific policymaker in interpreting the takings clause is to
determine when -justice" requires the state to pay compensation after
it has rearranged bundles of property rights between people, 17I not
whether a layperson would say that the state has "taken" a person's
thing. The scientific policymaker believes that the legal system is made
up not only of rules, but also of general principles describing the ab-
stract ideals the system seeks to further. These principles, which the
policymaker believes can resolve every potential case, are referred to by
168. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 151. Ackerman argues that much of this animates the
idea of public nuisance. Id at 153.
169. See id at 26-29.
170. Id at 27.
171. Id at 29-31.
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Ackerman as the "comprehensive view." '172 "Justice," in turn, is de-
fined differently depending upon whether the policies underlying the
comprehensive view are derived from utilitarian or Kantian theory.
For the utilitarian, who seeks to maximize social welfare, the task
is largely one of isolating the various costs associated with the rear-
rangement of property rights. 17 3 One type of cost is the effect of gen-
eral uncertainty, the reaction of risk-averse persons to the possibility
that government regulation making their activity more expensive will
be instituted. 74 A second cost, citizen disaffection, is the adverse reac-
tion of the general citizenry to the decision of the state of whether or
not to pay compensation. 175 The third factor in the utilitarian equation
is process costs, which are the costs of paying and processing compen-
sation claims. 176 Thus, the general form of the justice question for the
utilitarian scientific policymaker is "whether P <> U + D, where P =
process costs, U = uncertainty costs, and D = the costs of citizen disaf-
fection. If P > U + D, compensation should be denied; if P < U + D,
it should be granted." 177
From the Kantian perspective, the justice of the compensation
clause takes on a different meaning. 78 The Kantian scientific poli-
cymaker, who believes that people should be treated as ends rather
than means, views the people who lose property rights as having a spe-
cial claim to any gains accruing to others as a result of the state's ac-
tion. 179 Accordingly, for the Kantian, "compensation is required when
P < B - C, where P is process costs, B is project benefit, and C is other
project costs."' 80
The psychological constructs used in scientific policymaking con-
trast sharply with those used in ordinary observing. Nonreification of
property rights and reciprocity are underlying assumptions of scientific
policymaking, as is a distrust of moral realism. First, the scientific view
of property emphasizes rights between people with respect to things
172. Id at 11, 196 n.19.
173. See id at 41-70. A second factor is the function of the judicial role in relation to the
comprehensive view. Compare id at 31-39 (discussion ofjudicial role in scientific policymaking),
with id at 43-44 (discussion of judicial role in utilitarian adjudication).
174. Id at 44-45.
175. Id at 46-48.
176. Id at 45-46.
177. Id at 48.
178. See generally id at 71-87 (description of Kantian approaches to the compensation
clause).
179. Id at 74-75.
180. ld at 74.
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rather than rights in things, thus denying the importance of reification
in normative legal argument.
Second, the scientific policymaker relies on reciprocity rather than
causation as a basis for making legal decisions. The questions the ordi-
nary observer answers by using causation, the scientific policymaker
answers by reference to reciprocity and the comprehensive view. For
example, if a layperson would say that the state caused the taking of
one of his things, a prima facie case for compensation is established for
the ordinary observer. The ordinary observer also uses causation to
determine which parties are properly considered in a claim for com-
pensation, that is, the person who caused the taking and the person
who had property taken, and also which claims are justified, that is, all
those caused by the state without justification.
In contrast, for the scientific policymaker, causation is irrelevant to
whether compensation should be paid. Both utilitarians and Kantians
answer these same questions by reference to their version of the com-
prehensive view. For the utilitarian, the parties whose interests are
considered are those who generate process costs, uncertainty costs, and
citizen disaffection costs. Those claims that are deemed valid are deter-
mined by reviewing these costs in the manner described above. 18, For
the Kantian, a different set of interests are important and a different
test is used to determine which takings should be compensated.' 8 2 As
with the utilitarian, however, causation is not a relevant factor.
Third, and finally, the use of scientific policymaking indicates a
distrust of moral realism. Piaget's theory suggests that intuitionistic
thought is the fountainhead of moral realism.' 83 In his description of
scientific policymaking, however, Ackerman notes that "[i]t is central to
my thesis that this kind of highly abstract thinking does not spontane-
ously arise in the heads of all people everywhere."' 84 Thus, Ackerman
suggests that scientific policymaking is based on a rejection of moral
realism. Moreover, scientific policymaking expressly rejects existing
social structures-a prominent source of moral realism-as necessary
guides for legal analysis.'85
The psychological structure of scientific policymaking as a mode
181. See supra text accompanying notes 173-77.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 122-36.
184. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 90. For Ackerman's description of the structures of
modem American legal thought, see id at 90-93.
185. See id at 105-06, 180-82.
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of legal thought thus correlates with the constructs found in Calabresi's
tort theory. An emphasis on rights between people with respect to
things, reliance on an end-state theory to assess existing social struc-
tures (whether the ends be efficiency, wealth distribution, utility, or
Kantian), and a distrust of moral realism are elements common to Cal-
abresi's tort theory and scientific policymaking. Intuition and com-
monsense thought are downplayed in each, as attention is focused on
conflicting, explicit normative standards that are considered indepen-
dently from the merits of the individual case.
Ackerman's delineation of the distinction between the ordinary
observer's and the scientific policymaker's methods of legal analysis re-
lies on the same psychological constructs as those underlying the Ep-
stein/Calabresi debate over the Coase Theorem. An ordinary observer
uses reification, causation, and moral realism in ways similar to Ep-
stein, as well as laypeople, in making an intuitionistic argument against
the Coase Theorem. This connection suggests that the applicability of
the psychological dimension discussed in this Article is not limited to
the Coase Theorem, but instead may apply to all areas of legal analysis
as a descriptive component of common-law thought.'86
186. Ackerman's association of ordinary observing with conventional legal thought and the
further connection brought out in this Article between ordinary observing and the use of reifica-
tion, causation, and moral realism, suggest that these some psychological features may help to
define the general contours of common-law thought to a degree not previously recognized. While
a detailed development of this thesis is beyond the scope of the present Article, even a casual
consideration of the contours of common-law thought, particularly that during the Civil War
period to 1937, suggests that reification, causation, and moral realism played a prominent role in
defining the structure of legal thought.
In general, the legal thought of this period appears to make a prominent use of reification.
For example, the contours of common-law property, reflecting the influence of Blackstone, gener-
ally treated property as rights in "things" and ownership as complete dominion. Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone'r Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 311-20, 328-50 (1979); Vande-
velde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325, 328-33 (1980). Reification also appeared to play an important
role in conflict of laws and civil procedure. Conflict law emphasized the physical location of a
"thing" for contracts and property, and the physical location of the hurt or damage for torts.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 46-53, 208-13, 311-31, 377-78 (1934). Similarly, juris-
diction centered on the physical presence or control over things (in rem), e.g., Arndt v. Griggs, 134
U.S. 316, 320-21 (1980) ("[the state] has control over property within its limits"), and people (in
personam), e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power").
An intuitionistic sense of causation was, of course, a central aspect of tort law. G. WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA 92-102 (1980). This question often fractured into difficult intuitionistic
issues such as last clear chance, remoteness of damage, and intervening cause. Nevertheless, the
basic structure appears to be one animated by intuitionistic concepts of cause. See W. PRossnR,
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B. THE KELMAN/SPITZER-HOFFMAN DEBATE-ORDINARY
INTUITIONS, THE COASE THEOREM, AND SOME
SPECULATIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY BY LAWYERS
1. The Kelman/Spitzer-Hoffman Debate
In a recent exchange of articles, Matthew Spitzer and Elizabeth Hoff-
man debate Mark Kelman in an empirical defense of the Coase Theo-
rem. Kelman begins the exchange by attacking the validity of the
Coase Theorem, 87 which he views as the major ideological weapon
used by the conservative "Chicago schools" of law and of economics to
attack the use of state action.'88 Kelman argues that the Coase Theo-
rem is wrong because "[c]onsumers do not behave in a way such that
the Theorem holds true."'8 9 As evidence he relies on casual empirical
data showing that consumers do not treat opportunity income as the
equivalent of realized income. As Kelman explains in one of his
examples:
A fully rational individual, a professor at a business school, buys
a bottle of imported wine for $5. After its value increases, a wine
dealer with whom he regularly deals offers him $100 for the bottle of
wine. Although he has never purchased a bottle of wine for $100, in
fact, he-has never paid more than $35 for one and would not do so
now, the professor drinks the wine rather than sell it. What is ob-
served here is a dramatic divergence between the treatment of oppor-
tunity cost income and realized income. If Coase's hypothesis were
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 236-90 (4th ed. 1971). See also H.L.A. HART & A.M. Ho-
NORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1, 24-57 (1959).
The most obvious example of the use of moral realism was probably the special prominence
of "fault" in tort law. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 144-63 (1881) (concluding that tort
liability is based primarily on moral wrong). The use of moral realism was also evident, however,
in the implicit appeal to reified social standards with respect to such topics as proper public
speech, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), regulation of "public
morals," e.g., E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 172-241 (1904), "police power" generally, e.g., Id.,
and nuisance law, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra, at 573-82, 583-86, 596-602. In each case, conduct was
judged by reference to some presupposed dominant standard of good social conduct. Further, the
common law was also filled with such doctrines as the "reasonable man," "plain meanings," and
"intent of the Framers," all of which draw upon the idea of a reified structure of values easily
recognized by other members of the community.
187. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in te Coase Theorem, 52
S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979).
188. Id at 673-78. See also Kennedy, supra note 10, at 393-98 (discussing the deleterious
effect of the Coase Theorem on the economic underpinnings of the liberal reform movement);
Horwitz, supra note 14, at 906-10 (viewing the Coase Theorem as a "brilliant counterattack" to
liberal interventionist movement, creating the basis for conservative criticism of governmental
intervention).
189. Kelman, supra note 187, at 678.
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true, the individual must treat the $95 in opportunity cost income,
L e., the amount he would realize were he to sell the wine, just like the
received income that he actually possesses. However, the individual
does not do this. Although he would not spend $95 of realized in-
come on wine, he "spends" $95 of opportunity income on it.'9 °
Kelman posits several possible explanations for this behavior.19'
The first is that "people often care less about things that could be than
about things that are immediate and tangible."192 The second is that a
rise in income is less important to people than a fall in income.193 A
rise in income is expected to result in more saving because people have
not adjusted to spending this increase in income. 194 Thus, a decline in
the current standard of living is feared more than an equivalent rise in
income is desired. The third explanation, which Kelman personally
finds most persuasive, 195 is that consumers try to "close" transac-
tions.196 Kelman uses as a hypothetical the case of the consumer who
insists on continuing to play tennis at a club every week despite an
injury because he has already paid a $100 nonreturnable fee to join the
club:
The consumer, however, feels he would be wasting the $100 if he
does not play; he ignores the fact that no funds will be demanded in
the future and asks whether, in the past, he has received value for the
$100 he has spent. Consumers try to "close" transactions: $100 was
spent on tennis, and the consumer wants $100 of tennis value. 19 7
In the case of the tennis player, value has not yet been received for
payment. Kelman asserts that a consumer who already owns a good
has received value for it, and thus views the transaction as closed. As
such, he is willing to ignore any future opportunity income from the
190. Id at 678-79 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
191. Kelman maintains that the various rationales he puts forth only explain the motivation
behind the behavior he describes; they neither support nor challenge the basic validity of the
behaviors existence. Id at 678, 685. As Kelman explains:
For the purposes of this Article, it does not matter whether the behavior manifested by
the economic actors that have been discussed is rational or irrational, explicable or inex-
plicable. Insofar as the Coase Theorem is designed to undercut the notion that the liabil-
ity rules that determine who is legally accountable for harm in cases of mutual
interaction will affect substantive results--therefore to deny the inevitablity [sic] of polit-
ical decisions on the contours of the polity-it simply fails, liability rules will affect
substance.
Id at 685 (footnote omitted).
192. Id at 688. For examples of this, see id at 688-89.
193. Id at 689-91.
194. Id at 690.
195. Id at 688 n.52.
196. Id at 691-93.
197. Id at 691.
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initial transaction.19 8 Kelman concludes:
Coase's hypothesis was based on a single counterfactual assumption
that can be stated in two distinct ways: From one vantage point, he
assumes that people invariably place the same value on moving from
state A to some different state B as they would place on moving back
from B to 4. Alternatively stated, Coase assumes that people treat
opportunity income, which neoclassical economists feel people im-
plicitly "spend" whenever they do not sell a saleable right or good, in
the same way as actual received income, which they explicitly spend.
Consumers simply do not behave in this manner. 199
In reply,200 Spitzer and Hoffman attack Kelman's critique of the
Coase Theorem on two grounds. First, Spitzer and Hoffman argue that
Kelman's analysis is flawed because it is premised on a misunderstand-
ing of the use of formal models z.20  Kelman's critique, they contend, is
at best only an interesting hypothesis because Kelman failed to "prove"
his empirical hypothesis over a sufficiently large population, and in-
stead only relied on casual data suggesting exceptions to the formal
model assumed by the Coase Theorem.20 2 Second, Spitzer and Hoff-
man argue that even assuming the empirical validity of Kelman's state-
ment with respect to consumers, the Coase Theorem is not necessarily
moot because "even if producers do value realized income more than
they do opportunity income in profit-making situations, entrepreneurs
may be able to arbitrage the difference and generate an outcome identi-
cal to that predicted by the Coase Theorem. 20 3
198. d at 691-92.
199. Id at 698.
200. Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology
in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1187 (1980).
201. Id at 1190-92.
202. Id at 1194-1208.
203. Id at 1208. In a short rejoinder, Kelman maintains his belief that the Coase Theorem is
not valid. Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brlef Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215
(1980). Kelman briefly argues that, contrary to Spitzer's and Hoffman's claims to the contrary, his
empirical analysis of the theorem does demonstrate its invalidity. Id at 1215-19. He then shifts
his focus from an empirical analysis to argue that there exist two sociological perspectives of the
Coase Theorem. The first is the positivist view that the Coase Theorem is a potentially incorrect
view of reality. Id at 1219-20. The second perspective is a hermeneutic analysis, which sees the
theorem as an "internal statement expressing a culture," rather than an external statement that
describes a culture. Id at 1220 (emphasis omitted). For Kelman's full argument on this point, see
id at 1220-22. Rather than being dominated by one of these perspectives, Kelman argues that
people oscillate between them. Id at 1222-23. Because Spitzer and Hoffman respond only to the
positivist perspective, Kelman claims that they fail to rebut his claim that the Coase Theorem fails
as a hermeneutic device to adequately express our culture. Id at 1223.
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2. Ordinary Intuitions and the Coase Theorem
From the perspective of psychological theory, the debate between Kel-
man and Spitzer/Hoffman is largely one about the structure of the
Coase Theorem, and thus is a continuation of the same conflict be-
tween intuitionistic and formalistic modes of legal analysis present in
the Calabresi/Epstein dispute and in Ackerman's distinction between
ordinary observing and scientific policymaking.
Kelman's argument against the use of the Coase Theorem is that
consumers simply do not behave in such a way that it is true.20 4 Al-
though he does not explicitly consider the psychological genesis of his
critique, from such a perspective, an alternative statement of Kelman's
argument is that the Coase Theorem runs counter to the everyday intu-
itions of ordinary people. When Kelman presents casual data sug-
gesting that consumers do not equate realized income with opportunity
income, he is arguing (much like both Epstein and the ordinary ob-
server) that such an assumption conflicts with the psychological struc-
ture dominant in the "commonsense" behavior of laypersons.
Moreover, when Kelman appeals to people to recall an "internal realm
of resistance" to the Coase Theorem, he is implicitly making reference
to the existence of the conflicting, yet coexisting, psychological struc-
tures predicted by Piaget's theory. Indeed, although Kelman's princi-
pal argument with the Coase Theorem is a political one, u°5 at one point
204. See supra text accompanying note 189.
205. Kelman's attack on the Coase Theorem stems from what he views as its connection with
the conservative "Chicago Schoor' of law and of economics. However, while the Coase Theorem
has tended to be associated with conservative law and economics, primarily because of the influ-
ence of Richard Posner, this need not be so. It is true that the motivating force behind Coase's
writing of the article may well have been to promote theoretical support for an argument for less
government regulation on the basis of economic efficiency. See Coase, supra note 2, at 17-18, 42-
44; Horwitz, supra note 14, at 906-07; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 393-97. However, the theoretical
structure inherent in the Coase Theorem is not so easily cabined. While the structure of the Coase
Theoremforces a decision on wealth distribution, the theorem itself does not mandate what that
distribution should be. Before any distribution can be selected, a choice must be made on whether
or not to assume the presence of transaction costs. See Transaction Costs, supra note 12, at 69-70.
In addition, a determination must be made as to what entitlements should be assumed to be
fundamental. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 422-44. These choices cannot be made, and thus no
method of wealth distribution adopted, without recourse to normative political theory. Since the
Coase Theorem is silent on the choice of such a political theory, the theorem does not by its own
terms necessarily apply only to a particular school of thought.
Acceptance of the Coase Theorem, however, can systematically affect the choice of a guiding
political philosophy. A key feature of the theorem is that within the sphere of its operation, it
gives no special importance to the status quo. However, this is not determinative. If conservative
assumptions about the status quo are made, conservative results tend to follow; on the other hand,
if liberal assumptions about the status quo are made, liberal results tend to follow. If the "no
transaction costs" assertion is taken seriously, everybody can get together with everybody else and
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in his rejoinder he suggests, without elaboration, that the structure of
the Coase Theorem also might be explained on the basis of "psycholog-
ically oriented models of blocked perceptions. 2 °6 Indeed, Piaget's the-
negotiate about everything--in short, a modem-day version of the social compact. See Kennedy,
supra note 10, at 438-43. Coase, as well as most of the early law and economic commentators,
made the common-law assumption that the theorem is to be applied to a typical case-before a
judge, involving two parties, and so on. See, e.g., R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 117-62 (2d ed. 1978) (demonstrating the theorem's application to judge-made rules in
tort and property); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 65, 65-66 (1977) (the common law will always contain a greater proportion of efficient
rules than judges prefer); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51
(1977) (the efficiency of common law is related to society's decision to use the courts to settle
disputes). However, once the framework of the Coase Theorem is adopted, there is no reason why
the analysis cannot be broadened to apply to the social structure at large. The Coase Theorem, in
its broadest reading, simply asks "what type of social structure do we want and why do we want
it?" Of course, the answer may be "wealth maximization." R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUS-
TICE 48-115 (1981 ); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 487passim (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, andLegal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103passim (1979). See generally Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 485passim (1980) (exploring both positive and normative aspects of economic anal-
ysis). But it can be only after certain assumptions are made. The first is that wealth maximization
is the normative political theory to use; the second, that the existing distribution of wealth and
social structure are correct. Posner seems to imply this latter assumption because he sets entitle-
ments by use of price, and a price structure requires that the status quo will be used. See Cole-
man, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1980). As
Posner has recently recognized, wealth maximization must be based on a political theory such as
consent. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basisfor the Eiciency Norm in Common Law Adjudlca.
tion, supra, at 491-502. Despite his apparent belief that normative political argument is not "law,"
Posner, Lawyers as Philosophers:A ckerman and Others (Book Review), 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 231,231-33, 249, Posner must at least impliedly rely on political theory as much as the
self-conscious political theorist. Thus, wealth maximization is but one political theory that the
Coase Theorem could accommodate. Others might be utilitarian, see B. ACKERMAN, supra note
35, at 41-70; Kantian, see id at 71-87; contractarian, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);
liberalist, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); or Marxist, see
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and theAmerican Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the
Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1345-58 (1979). The only restrictions imposed by the Coase
Theorem appear to be that the status quo not be given special legitimacy simply because it is the
status quo, for this would constitute an undue reliance on reification, and would require that an
activist state role be assumed for the state. For a contrary argument, see R. NOZiCK, supra note
21, at 297-334 (proposing a model for utopia based on a minimal state role). In other words, the
Coase Theorem favors distributive or end-state justice over transactional or historical justice.
206. Kelman, supra note 203, at 1222. The context of Kelman's statement is the following:
To the extent that law and economic literature proceeded for nearly twenty years ignor-
ing a perfectly accessible behavioral assumption, there is reason to inquire into the social
function and structure of the mode of thought. Thus, it is worth explaining why the
point raised inmy piece had never previously appeared, if only to deny its significance.
It is hardiy a ditcult or complex point, yet it goes to the very heart of the most widely
cited law and economics proposition in academic legal life. Whether one accounts for
this systematic distortion of thought, as I did in my original article, as reflective of an
explicit political agenda and particular concrete interests, or one developspsychologcally
oriented models of blockedperceptions, part of the story one must tell in dealing with a
theory is, once again, a story of the theorists.
Id at 1222 (emphasis added).
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ory suggests that such a "psychologically oriented model" exists and
that reification, causation, and moral realism serve as those "blocked
perceptions."
A consumer intuitively may not equate realized income and op-
portunity income, counter to the assumption of the Coase Theorem, for
the simple reason that the latter concept is alien to the established con-
tours of the psychology of everyday thought." 7 Together, the three
rationales offered by Kelman as possible explanations of such behavior
by consumers-the "could be versus the is," the growth of income, and
"closing" transactions-indicate a psychological preference for the tan-
gible, the status quo, and the realized. In turn, this correlates generally
to the use of reification, moral realism, and, to a lesser extent,
causation.
207. An analogous problem-the definition of "income" in the tax law- was recently consid-
ered by Mark Campisano in Ordinary Observing and Utilitarian Policymaking in the Internal Reve-
nue Code, supra note 143. Campisano suggests that before a layman considers an increase in
wealth as income, he requires a transfer of something of value that is severable so that it can then
be exchanged for other goods or services. Id at 792-94. Campisano also argues that this increase
does not count as income until it is "in his hands" or under his control. Id at 797-98. Thus, to a
layman the concept of imputed income--the analogue to Kelman's argument about opportunity
income and realized income in the context of the Coase Theorem-is an anathema. As
Campisano explains:
The transfer requirement allows the ordinary observer to respond quickly and easily
to certain questions about the nature of "income." Take, for example, the issue of "im-
puted" income from domestic services. If the ordinary observer were asked whether the
cash value of a housewife's homemaking services in the couple's own home should be
included as income on the couple's joint tax return, he would answer emphatically in the
negative. The fact that her services obviously had some value to the couple would be
irrelevant because, to the layman-whose opinion is determinative for the ordinary ob-
server--the decisive fact is that no one paid the housewife to do her chores.... He
would find it preposterous that the housewife should pay a tax when she did not earn any
money. The layman would certainly reach the same conclusion if he were asked whether
he should have to report as income the rental value of his home. Indeed, because of the
prerequisite of a transfer that inheres in the commonsense meaning of "income," the
layman would unequivocally reject any attempt to levy a tax on any income that was
"imputed" to him. As far as he, and therefore the ordinary observer, is concerned, im-
puted income is not income at all.
Id at 793.
Campisano's discussion of imputed income is not exactly analogous to the opportunity in-
come/realized income dichotomy in the Coase Theorem. Campisano is concerned with the ordi-
nary interpretation of income in the absence of consummated transactions, while Kelman is
concerned with why such transactions are not made by consumers. Nonetheless, the two issues
contain the common thread of a layperson's concept of "control," which, in turn, would appear to
be related to the use of reification. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 127-29 (discussing the
importance of the concept of "control" in the takings context). Most importantly, both
Campisano and Kelman recognize the divergence of "commonsense" intuitions from other for-
malistic methods of analysis.
Campisano's article is also relevant as an example of the use of the ordinary observing and
scientific policymaking modes of analysis described by Bruce Ackerman in Private Property and
the Constitution, discussed supra in notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
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Because of the layperson's tendency to reify, tangible items, that is,
things, are preferred over intangible potentialities. Thus it is not sur-
prising from the standpoint of Piaget's theory to find, as Kelman notes,
that people generally value a certain chance of receiving $500 over a
fifty percent chance of receiving $1000 and fear a certain loss of $500
more than a fifty percent chance of losing $1000, or that a person may
be more upset about losing $50 from his pocket than failing to save $50
on the price of a washing machine because he failed to check the prices
of a similar machine in a store next door.20 8 In each case the loss of a
tangible item is deemed more substantial. Also, because of the influ-
ence of moral realism, which favors present values and existing stan-
dards, the status quo takes on favored status. People tend to use the
status quo as a starting point and attempt to justify it. In addition, the
use of causation implies an existing background of events that the indi-
vidual's causative actions has changed.20 9 Thus, change is defined by
reference to the status quo. Without the status quo as a reference point,
the concept of causation is unmanageable. Finally, realized events are
more important than potential events because of elements of control
which in turn appear to be related to reification. Moreover, once real-
ized, an event becomes part of the status quo and thus is given prefer-
ence. Whatever the exact genesis of Kelman's specific argument that
laypeople prefer realized income, and thus his general claim that they
do not accept the Coase Theorem, it seems clear that the psychic pref-
erence for the status quo is an important part of that argument. Be-
cause of the correlation between the psychological constructs used by
Kelman and those used by Epstein and Ackerman's ordinary observer,
it appears that this preference is not due to random or "irrational" be-
havior, but rather, is due to the predictable features of intuitionistic
thought.
This theory is also consistent with the observations of Spitzer and
Hoffman. In defense of the Coase Theorem, Spitzer and Hoffman ar-
gue that even if Kelman's argument might prove true for consumers,
entrepreneurs could arbitrage any difference between consumer con-
duct of the kind described by Kelman and that assumed in the Coase
Theorem and thus still generate a result identical to the Coase Theo-
rem. While not a point that Spitzer and Hoffman would be willing to
accept without empirical proof, this is nonetheless a recognition on
208. Kelman, supra note 187, at 689.
209. This appears to be the main thrust of Borgo, supra note 74.
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their part that these two contrasting modes of thought can coexist.210
Moreover, should Spitzer and Hoffman devise what they consider to be
a true empirical test of the Coase Theorem,21' it would be important to
consider the background of the subjects. If laypersons are included, the
intuitionistic thinking of the kind described by Kelman would be ex-
pected to dominate. On the other hand, if persons with substantial eco-
nomic training were made the subjects of the study, it would be
expected that most of them would conform to the predictions of the
Coase Theorem, although one might nonetheless expect varying behav-
ior even by these groups in their personal as opposed to their profes-
sional capacity.
Thus, both Kelman and Spitzer/Hoffman recognize the possibility
that laypersons may not act as the Coase Theorem would predict (al-
though Kelman more so than Spitzer and Hoffman). What distin-
guishes their positions are the conclusions each draws from that
possibility. For Kelman, the existence of counterexamples to the Coase
Theorem is important because they represent areas set off from the in-
fluence of the Coase Theorem, and thus suggest that the theorem is not
210. Campisano, supra note 143, also contributes to this point in his suggestion that business
taxpayers should be treated differently than individual taxpayers:
The result of these differing characteristics is that the ethical justifications for an
ordinary-observing approach to taxation are significantly less persuasive with respect to
the business taxpayer than with respect to the personal taxpayer. The ethical justifica-
tions for ordinary observing are grounded in the propriety of protecting the expectations
of the layman. But the business taxpayer's expectations are weaker and his world-view
more sophisticated than those of the personal taxpayer. Because the business taxpayer
experiences taxes simply as a cost of doing business, to be passed along like any other
cost, his tax expectations must be considered less substantial and less in need of protec-
tion than those of the personal taxpayer, who experiences all taxes fully, as a direct
reduction in his standard of living. Further, because the business taxpayer is a legal
sophisticate, at least in the sense that he forms his expectations with the aid of legal
advice, his tax expectations are not as vulnerable to disappointment as those of the per-
sonal taxpayer, who forms his expectations from lay experience alone. In sum, even in
its own terms, the case in favor of ordinary observing is substantially weaker for business
taxation than it is for personal taxation.
Id at 821-22 (footnotes omitted). See generally id at 818-32 (providing a more extensive discus-
pion of the businessman/layman distinction and Campisano's argument in favor of different tax
treatment for each).
211. Hoffman and Spitzer attempt an empirical proof of the Coase Theorem in Hoffman &
Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J. L. & ECON. 73 (1982). Interestingly
enough, the subjects of the experiment, college students, tended to come to a decision in which the
participants shared the profit in a more or less equal fashion, rather than attempting to maximize
their own payoff. Id at 91-95. This point obviously troubled Hoffman and Spitzer. Id at 93 &
n.47. In fact, it seems as if this data reinforces some of Kelman's initial observations. Given the
artificial setting in which the students had to perform and what must have seemed the "windfall"
nature of the situation, this generally comports with some of Kelman's casual data. See Kelman,
supra note 187, at 689-90 (treatment of windfall gain). More importantly, the cultural aspects of
the use of the Coase Theorem have still not been confronted.
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as complete a model of society as its proponents suggest. In contrast,
for Spitzer and Hoffman, the existence of these two vantage points is
only of secondary importance and perhaps is even irrelevant. For
them, if the Coase Theorem remains true in at least some areas it will,
much like their entrepreneur, dominate the rest. Ultimately, the con-
clusion each draws is political; however, they are conclusions bound up
in the psychology of the Coase Theorem and the significance to be
drawn from the existence of these two structures of thought.
CONCLUSION
During the last several decades there has been an increased perception
that the traditional common-law approach to the law is losing its place
as the dominant mode of analysis in legal scholarship. The furor over
the incursions of economics into normative legal analysis,212 the in-
creased interest in legal theory,2t 3 and the growing perception that legal
scholarship is in need of new direction,2 t4 are all signs of transition in
the legal culture. The purpose of this Article has been to sharpen the
perception of what this transition is, as well as to suggest some direc-
tion for further study on why it is coming about. The immediate pur-
pose of this Article has been only to point out the general connection,
in a descriptive sense, between the Coase Theorem, other modes of le-
gal thought, and the use of particular psychological constructs.
One set of propositions focuses on the psychology of human
thought in general. It is sufficient for present purposes that Piaget's
theory of developmental psychology establishes the basic validity of
several propositions, even though psychologists may debate among
212. In addition to the works cited supra note 14, see NOMOS XXIV, ETHICS, ECONOMICS,
AND THE LAW 3-103 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1982); Efficiency as a Legal Concern (pts. 1 &
2), 8 HOFSTRA L. RE. 485, 811 (1980); Carroll, Two Games Thal Illustrate Some Problems Con-
cerning EconomicAnalysis of Legal Problems, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1980); Polinsky, Economic
Analysis as a Potentialy Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner'r Economic Analysis of
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974).
213. Commentary on legal theory certainly has enjoyed a renaissance. A sampling of these
writings include B. ACKERMAN, supra note 35; M. HoRwnrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. RE. 1057 (1980); Kennedy, supra note 10; Kennedy, Form and Sub.
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kennedy, LegaltFormality, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to
Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REy. 1669 (1982).
214. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 68-111 (1977); Legal Scholarship:
Its Nature andPurposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981) (symposium discussing the current state of legal
scholarship).
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themselves about the fine points of their application. First, because of
the nature of the development of human thought, two contrasting sets
of psychological constructs exist in the thoughts of children. Second,
the constructs that correspond to the earlier stages of development still
influence the thought of adults, even though they change in some ways
as a person matures. Third, due to the continuing influence of such
constructs (particularly reification, causation, and moral realism) intui-
tionistic thought-the common sense of laypersons--contains a pre-
dictable and consistent structure.
A second set of arguments, those based on the current status of the
legal culture, suggests that these psychological propositions are linked
in some way to the debate in the legal culture about the Coase Theo-
rem. The first is that traditional legal training, because of its reliance
on a sophisticated application of the intuitive thought of laypersons,
makes significant use of reification, causation, and moral realism. The
use of these constructs plays an important role in defining the structure
of common-law thought in general, and is not linked just to the debate
between Epstein and Calabresi on tort theory, Ackerman's treatment of
the takings clause, or the debate between Kelman and Spitzer/Hoff-
man on an empirical proof of the Coase Theorem. Finally, as these
debates demonstrate, the psychological structure of the Coase Theorem
is incompatible with the psychological structure of common-law
thought. Thus, the Coase Theorem is controversial in part because it
challenges the implicit, yet critical, proposition of traditional legal
training that normative legal argument must ultimately be grounded in
the intuitionistic thought of laypersons.
At the same time, however, this Article suggests that the psychol-
ogy of the Coase Theorem has certain limitations and that further con-
nections must be made between the psychology of the Coase Theorem
and other aspects of legal theory. The psychology of the Coase Theo-
rem, alone, cannot adequately address the political or cultural aspects
of legal thought. While this psychological analysis can provide a useful
descriptive account of the structure of common-law thought and of the
Coase Theorem, it cannot provide an answer as to why common-law
thought rose to prominence when it did, why it is losing its hold on the
legal culture, or why the Coase Theorem began to gain acceptance in
the legal culture when it did. Thus, before any final assessment can be
made of the reaction of the present legal culture to the Coase Theorem,
two additional areas must be addressed: the relationship between the
psychology of the Coase Theorem and political theory; and the rela-
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tionship between the psychology of the Coase Theorem and the con-
struction of reality by lawyers. Each of these topics will be considered
in subsequent articles, but at this point several general connections can
be noted. First, a connection may well exist between the use of certain
psychological constructs in normative legal argument and adherence to
particular political theories.215 For example, Epstein's argument that
"[p]rivate property is an external manifestation of the principle of per-
sonal autonomy" 216 correlates to, and perhaps is tantamount to, an ar-
gument that reification should play a normative role in political theory.
Similarly, the common law, Epstein's tort theory, and ordinary observ-
ing all tend to be associated with historical justice frameworks, while
the Coase Theorem, Calabresi's tort theory, and scientific policymaking
all tend to be associated with distributive justice or end-state political
theories.
Second, a connection may exist between the use of the Coase The-
orem and social construction of reality by the legal culture.217 Al-
though perhaps most explicit in the exchange between Kelman and
Spitzer/Hoffman, one of the concerns of Ackerman's work on ordinary
observing and scientific policymaking (as well as an implicit concern of
the Epstein/Calabresi debate) is the possibility that different modes of
legal thought exist and that these, in turn, are directly related to the
professional training of lawyers.
The possibility of these further connections between the Coase
Theorem and political theory and professional training suggests one
final point, the truth or falsity of which could be of extreme importance
to the legal culture. It certainly is the case that the Coase Theorem
grates on the hardened intuitions of so many lawyers because of its
psychology, but it may also be the case that Ronald Coase's parable
grates on the hardened intuitions of so many lawyers quite simply be-
cause it is a story about the death of the common law.
215. For some initial efforts linking legal thought to political structures, see B. ACKERMAN,
supra note 35, at 179-83 (discussing ordinary observing, scientific policymaking and the relation to
political theory); R. UNGER, supra note 213, at 72-100 (analyzing the connection between imper-
sonal laws and a deeper set of presuppositions about thought and society); Ackerman, Four Ques.
tionsfor Legal Theory, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 351, 366-71 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1980) (discussing impact on normative questions by communicating as ordinary observers as op-
posed to scientific policymakers); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
supra note 213 (analyzing how and why lawyers choose between using rules or equitable stan-
dards to support legal arguments in private law adjudication).
216. Nuisance Law, supra note 19, at 63.
217. For initial efforts here, see Ackerman, Four Questionsfor Legal heory, supra note 215,
at 371-72 (predicting a shift from ordinary observing to scientific policymaking among lawyers).
